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Abstract
The dissertation consists of three essays studying the economics of education and program
evaluation. Chapter 1 examines the impact of attending a magnet school on student achieve-
ment using school admissions lotteries in Wuhan, China. Although lottery winners were
more likely to attend magnet schools that appear better in many dimensions, including peer
achievement, I find little evidence that winning a lottery improved students' performance on
the High School Entrance Exam or their enrollment status at elite high schools three years
later. Magnet school popularity, measured by either the competitiveness of the admission
lottery or the take-up rate of lottery winners, is highly positively correlated with the aver-
age student achievement, but largely unrelated to the treatment effect on test scores that
I estimate for each school. This evidence suggests that parents value peer quality beyond
its effect on achievement gains, or confuse average student achievement with value added.
The finding that magnet schools are sought mainly for their observed superiority in average
student achievement rather than for their academic value added casts doubt on the potential
of school choice to improve student achievement, at least in this context.
Chapter 2 studies peer effects on student test scores in middle school using a multi-cohort
longitudinal data set from China. I base the identification on variation in peer composition
across adjacent cohorts within the same school to control for student sorting across schools
and the unobserved school characteristics that affect student outcomes. The existing peer
effects literature pays little attention to the potential positive correlation in measurement
errors between the individual- and the peer-level lagged test score variables, which I find
important in my data. Such a positive correlation in measurement errors arises because the
individual- and the peer-level lagged test score variables are subject to transitory common
shocks due to the continuing presence of a student's former peers in her current peer group.
I derive formally that the presence of transitory common shocks on lagged test scores will
lead to a negative bias in the estimate of peer effects, and propose an empirical strategy to
address this problem by using the lagged test score measures of new peers to instrument for
the corresponding lagged test score measures of all peers. The within-school IV estimate of
the linear-in-means model shows little evidence that having peers of higher average lagged
test score significantly improves a student's test score. Estimates of heterogeneous peer
effects models, however, show some evidence in favor of ability tracking.
Chapter 3 investigates the nonparametric analysis of randomized program evaluation.
Observational problems following randomization sometimes prevent researchers from collect-
ing complete and error-free outcome data. The problem is more serious if sample selection
varies by treatment status and interacts with data contamination (imperfect matching). In
Chapter 3, I develop a trimming procedure for nonparametric analysis of average treatment
effects in the presence of sample attrition and imperfect matching, as well as their inter-
actions. I show that, if prior knowledge or a consistent estimator of data contamination
rate is available and the treatment status affects sample selection in "one direction," the
proposed trimming procedure can construct bounds on average treatment effects for a spe-
cific subpopulation whose outcomes would be observed irrespective of treatment assignment
status.
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Chapter 1
Magnet Schools and Student
Achievement: Evidence from a
Randomized Natural Experiment in
China
1.1 Introduction
Recent decades have seen growing efforts in several countries (e.g., Chile, China, Pakistan,
and the United States) to improve educational outcomes by increasing the scope of schooling
alternatives available to parents and students. The popularity of school choice is based
upon the belief that increasing parental choice can yield improved efficiency in education
production through enhanced competition or better matches between students and schools
(e.g., Friedman, 1962; Chub and Moe, 1990; Hoxby, 2000).
The ability of the choice mechanism to improve educational outcomes turns in part on
the extent to which parents express their preference for achievement gains. Some previous
studies have found that parents do not necessarily seem to place the highest weight on
academic outcomes (Hastings et al., 2005, 2006; Jacob and Levitt, 2006; Jacob and Lefgren,
2007), and may not know which schools are likely to benefit their child the most academically
(Figlio and Lucas, 2004; Mizala and Urquiola, 2007). Moreover, if peer externalities play a
significant role in value added, parents may rationally prefer a poorly-run school with good
peers to a well-run school with bad peers (Willms and Echols, 1992). As noted by Rothstein
(2006), any of these factors will dilute the incentives for efficiency improvement that choice
might otherwise create.
A growing body of empirical work has used random assignment to estimate the effect
on academic outcomes of attending a school other than the local public school.' Some of
these studies show benefits (e.g., Green et al., 1999; Hoxby and Rockoff, 2004; Lai, et al.,
2008) but others show little or no effect (e.g., Howell and Peterson, 2002; Krueger and
Zhu, 2004). Cullen et al. (2006), in a study closely related to this work, use lotteries to
evaluate the impact of attending a sought-after school in the Chicago Public Schools. They
find no evidence that winning a lottery to attend a sought-after school improves students'
performance on a variety of traditional academic measures. In contrast, Angrist et al. (2002,
1Theoretically, it could be that school choice benefits all students through increased competition, including
those who remain in attendance area schools. So the partial equilibrium effect could be an overestimate or
an underestimate of the overall effect. Unfortunately, due to the extreme difficulty in the identification, little
evidence exists regarding the potential for schools to respond to the enhanced competitive pressure induced
by school choice (e.g., Hoxby, 2003; Figlio and Rouse, 2006; Hsieh and Urquiola, 2006; Carnoy et al., 2007).
The research designs of the limited studies on the general equilibrium impact of school choice are far from
ideal, and do not necessarily rule out other explanations for the improvements (Rouse and Barrow, 2008).
2006) find consistently positive effects of private school vouchers on grade completion and
test scores in Colombia. One possible explanation of this difference in findings is that there
might be more potential for school choice programs to generate large efficiency gains in
developing countries that have less efficient public schools and less competitive schooling
environments.
This chapter presents new evidence on the impact of choice on student achievement and
the question of how parents choose schools. The evidence comes from a particular form of
school choice in China that allows students access to alternative magnet (gaizhi) schools
outside their assigned local public schools by paying an additional charge. This chapter
answers two questions: First, what is the direct impact of attending a magnet school on
student achievement? Second, is there any evidence that parents chose the most academically
beneficial school for their child?
Students in China are assigned to primary schools (grades 1-6) and neighborhood middle
schools (grades 7-9) based on their residence. Middle school graduates take a citywide uni-
form High School Entrance Exam (HSEE) and are tracked into different types of secondary
schools (grades 10-12) based on their HSEE test scores. Magnet schools exist only at the
middle school level and open their enrollment to all interested students within the city will-
ing to pay the tuition. Magnet schools in China share many common features with their
U.S. counterparts:2 they are located mainly in large cities,3 have better qualified teachers
and higher per pupil spending than neighborhood public schools, are highly sought after,
2 See Steel and Levine (1994) for an in-depth study of magnet schools in the U.S.
3 One in six middle school students in large Chinese cities are enrolled in magnet schools. While in the
U.S., though magnet schools only account for 4 percent of the overall enrollment nationwide, they enroll 15
percent students in districts where magnet programs are available. The majority of these magnet districts
are urban districts in large metropolitan areas.
and enroll a disproportionate number of students from families with high socioeconomic sta-
tus (SES) and high primary school test scores. Lotteries are often used by oversubscribed
magnet schools to determine admission eligibility, providing identification for magnet school
attendance for students with a variety of academic backgrounds.
A number of features of Chinese magnet schools make the Chinese context especially
interesting and informative. First, in contrast to the United States, magnet schools in China
have the same curriculum as other neighborhood schools. Achievement is measured by
test scores on the HSEE, which are almost the sole determinant of their secondary school
admission status. This unidimensional, high-stakes exam provides a good benchmark for
evaluating the impact of magnet school attendance. Second, because choice is costly for
parents, the perceived difference between magnet schools and neighborhood public schools
must be substantial, making it an ideal context to compare parental perception of what
constitutes a "good school" to evidence of effective value added.
The data set used in this chapter consists of over 13,000 students who participated in the
admissions lotteries of magnet schools during 2002-2004 in three school districts in Wuhan,
China. I match applicants in the lottery data to administrative records of the city's HSEE
database to obtain student information on middle school enrollment status, HSEE test scores,
and secondary school admission status. Although not all students complied with their lottery
assignment and about half of the lottery losers managed to get into the magnet school they
chose through the "back door," winning a lottery still increased the probability of enrolling
in that magnet school by 33 percentage points. Despite the fact that lottery winners had
access to a better peer group, better qualified teachers, and a school they chose (and that
hence might better suit their learning needs), I find little evidence that winning a lottery is
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associated with any academic benefit to students. The point estimates of the two-stage least
squares (2SLS) regressions of students' HSEE test scores on their magnet school enrollment
status using lottery outcomes as an instrument are all insignificant, and allow me to reject
a modest gain of 0.1 standard deviation (SD) at the five percent level.
If magnet schools do not improve academic outcomes, why are parents willing to pay
for them? One possibility is that parents value things other than academic success when
choosing a school. In a context of heterogeneous parental preferences, parents who value
other school attributes may be willing to trade academic gains for utility gains in other
dimensions. Although magnet schools in Wuhan are better in nonacademic attributes -
such as physical environment, classroom discipline, and peer behavior - than neighborhood
public schools, this is unlikely to be the main explanation here, given the importance of
students' HSEE test scores in high school admission. Another possibility is that parents
place high value on average student achievement when choosing a school, either because
they value peer quality beyond its effect on value added, or because they confuse average
achievement with value added. Even though the empirical evidence cannot distinguish these
two underlying reasons, either of them being true would lead schools to be sought for their
observed student achievement. Indeed, I find that magnet school popularity, measured by
either the competitiveness of the admission lottery or the take-up rate of lottery winners,
is highly positively correlated with the average student achievement, but largely unrelated
to the treatment effect on student achievement that I estimate for each school. The finding
that magnet schools are sought mainly for their observed superiority in student achievement
rather than for their academic value added casts doubt on the potential of school choice to
improve student achievement, at least in this context.
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 provides background on the
middle school system and the admission procedure of magnet schools in Wuhan. Section
1.3 introduces the data and presents some descriptive statistics. Section 1.4 presents the
impact of winning a lottery on magnet school enrollment and peer achievement. Section 1.5
discusses the reduced-form effect of winning a lottery and the causal effect of attending a
magnet school - identified by using lottery status as an instrument - on students' academic
outcomes. Section 1.6 examines the magnitude and the likely sign of the potential biases
in the main results due to differential sample attrition between lottery winners and losers.
Section 1.7 discusses possible explanations for parental school choice that are consistent with
the empirical evidence here. Section 8 provides concluding remarks.
1.2 Background
With a population of over 4.5 million, Wuhan is the fourth most populous city in China.
Situated at the confluence of the Yangzi River and its longest tributary, the Hanshui River,
the city comprises three parts: North Bank (Hankou), West Bank (Hanyang), and South
Bank (Wuchang) (see Figure 1-1). The three parts can be considered as independent enroll-
ment areas as students rarely commute across river for schooling. In this chapter, I focus
on all three school districts (Districts 1-3) in the North Bank for which data are available.
The middle school system in the North Bank includes 74 middle schools and enrolls approx-
imately 60,000 students, accounting for about 45 percent of the city's enrollment in middle
school.
Enrollment at primary school is based on residence. Graduates from primary school are
assigned to a neighborhood middle school through an assignment mechanism that works at
the neighborhood level. But all eight of the magnet schools in the North Bank - two to
three from each district - have opted out of the assignment mechanism and opened their
enrollment to all interested students from the entire school district or even beyond district
boundaries. Before 2002, these magnet schools required applicants to take entrance exams
and admitted almost all the top-scoring students in each school district. To ease the exam
pressure on children and reduce the across-school inequality in student ability, starting in
2002, the city education council banned the use of any form of entrance exam in middle
school admissions and required admissions to all public schools to be based on residence..
In order to retain their open enrollment policy, all these magnet schools transformed into
privately sponsored public schools.4 Public middle schools are tuition-free under China's
Nine-Year Compulsory Schooling Law. By switching to a semi-private financing structure,
these magnet schools could continue to receive funding from the local government but also
charge tuition to students.5  All magnet schools set their tuition at US $400 per year,6
the price ceiling allowed by the city education council. (For reference, the average annual
disposable income of a three-person family was roughly $3,000 in the city during the period
under study.)
4The semi-privatization had started even before 2002 for a few magnet schools, some of which had by
then been transformed into privately sponsored public schools in order to charge discriminatory tuitions to
students who scored below the admission cutoff score on the entrance exams. The tuition varied between
$400 and $800 per year, depending on how far a student's test score was away from the admission cutoff.
The 2002 reform, however, caused the semi-privatization movement to sweep through all magnet schools.
5 Revenue from tuition was divided among the magnet school, the school district, and the city education
council in a 5:4:1 ratio. School districts and the city education council used their share of revenue to fund
capital expenditures on neighborhood middle schools with poor facilities. Basic salaries of magnet school
teachers were paid from the local government budget, which was why these magnet schools were not purely
private schools. But magnet schools provided much higher overall compensation to their teachers via school-
funded benefits and performance pay.
6All monetary amounts in the paper refer to U.S. dollars, converted by the exchange rate at the time of
the study.
Each student could apply to only one magnet school in the city and would be disqualified
from enrolling in any magnet school if caught submitting multiple applications. Districts 2
and 3 allowed magnet schools in their district to set aside a fraction (up to 50 percent) of
their admission quota for advance admission exclusively for qualified applicants: applicants
with award records in city- or district-level academic, artistic, and athletic contests. In order
to attract the most talented students, all magnet schools guaranteed admission (through
formal or informal channels) and offered full or half tuition waivers to students with extra-
ordinary award records. As magnet schools differed in the selectivity of their criteria for
advance admission and tuition waivers as well as the competitiveness of their admissions
lotteries, students might be strategic in selecting which magnet school to apply to and did
not necessarily choose their most preferred school.
All magnet schools were oversubscribed for the period studied here as demand at the
regulated tuition far exceeded the admissions quotas. In a few cases, because the number of
qualified applicants of a magnet school exceeded its advance admission quota, an advance
lottery was conducted to select among qualified applicants. Qualified applicants who had
lost out in the advance lottery, however, could get a second chance to gain admission (to the
same magnet school) through the main lottery. Every year, a main lottery was conducted
for each magnet school among its general applicants, plus its qualified applicants who did
not win admission in the advance lottery (if any), to assign the rest of the admission quota
randomly. In each lottery, a computer program randomly assigned a lottery number to each
student. The magnet school enrolled students with the lowest numbers first until it filled its
admission quota for that lottery. All admissions lotteries were certified by notaries public
to verify their randomness to prevent tampering. Lottery winners were required to make
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an upfront payment of their three-year tuition (net of the waiver provision, if any) by the
deadline announced by the school, and those who did not pay their tuition by the deadline
were considered to have declined their admission offer. A significant portion of applicants
who had lost the main lottery, however, still managed to get into the magnet school they
applied to through the "back door."7 A typical magnet school in the city admitted about
one-third of their students by advance admission, one-third through the main lottery, and
one-third through the "back door."
For students from District 2 (where pre-lottery test scores are available), Figure 1-2-A
shows the Kernel density curves of their 6th grade combined math and Chinese test scores
(standardized to have zero mean and unit variance for each cohort) by their magnet school
enrollment status. There is clear evidence that magnet schools removed a disproportionate
share of high-achieving students from their assigned neighborhood middle schools. Students
enrolled in magnet schools had a mean 6th grade test score that was 0.47 SD above the
district average. In contrast, students enrolled in neighborhood middle schools had a mean
6th grade test score 0.10 SD below the district average. Figure 1-2-B shows two sources
of student sorting: advance admission recipients and main lottery participants had mean
6th grade test scores that were about 0.68 SD and 0.31 SD above the district average,
respectively, leaving the nonparticipants a mean test score 0.21 below the district average.
7The tuition paid by students who entered through the "back door" varied between $400 and $800 per
year, with the latter being set by the city education council as the maximum allowable charge. But being
willing to pay the maximum allowable charge was not sufficient for an applicant to gain admittance to a
magnet school. The most important factor determining whether a lottery loser could be admitted through
the "back door" was whether she had a referee who was important enough to influence the decision of
the principal (e.g., a government official her parents found through their personal social network). The
student's academic performance at primary school was another factor, but of secondary importance. The
final tuition charged for a student admitted through the "back door" was determined by taking into account
the importance of her referee, the closeness of her relationship with her referee, and her academic performance
at primary school.
Another schooling option for students is to attend a private middle school, which receives
no public funding and is financed entirely by student tuition. Most private middle schools are
boarding schools located in neighboring counties outside the city's urban boundary. Private
middle schools are generally considered as inferior to magnet schools and only account for a
very small share (less than two percent) of middle school enrollment. Nonetheless, private
middle schools were still likely to be the option some lottery participants might choose,
especially lottery losers who could not get into the magnet school they applied to through
the "back door."
1.3 Data Description and Summary Statistics
With the cooperation of the notary public office in the North Bank, I have obtained the
administrative data of three cohorts of students who participated in the main lotteries of
all the eight magnet schools in the North Bank during 2002-2004. The lottery data include
each applicant's name, gender, qualification status, lottery outcome, and primary school
graduated from. I exclude a small fraction (3.5 percent) of applicants who were enrolled in
primary schools outside the North Bank at the time of the application. (Note that excluding
these students does not affect the validity of the randomization because their primary school
enrollment status was predetermined at the time of the lottery.) The final sample consists
of 13,769 applicants who participated in 21 lotteries of all the eight magnet schools in the
North Bank during 2002-2004,8 including 997 qualified applicants in eight of the lotteries
8 Three lotteries conducted in the year 2003 in District 2 are excluded because the notary public office's
records for these lotteries only contain information on the lottery winners, but not the losers.
of four of these magnet schools. 9 Students in the full sample constitute approximately 23
percent of all students who transitioned from primary school to middle school in the North
Bank during this three-year period. For applicants from District 2, I have obtained their
6th grade test scores from the school district. But no pre-lottery test scores are available for
applicants from the other two districts.
Overall, these admissions lotteries were competitive: on average, only three out of ten
participants won their lottery. There is little evidence of any association between win/loss
status and students' predetermined individual characteristics at the time of the lottery. This
can be seen in Panel A of Table 1-1. Columns 1 and 2 present lottery losers' means for each
dependent variable and the coefficients from separate regressions of each dependent variable
on an indicator variable for winning a lottery and a full set of lottery fixed effects, respectively.
The full sample of all lottery participants who applied from the North Bank is used in column
2, providing a test of the randomness of the lotteries among applicants from the North Bank.
Columns 3 and 4 report lottery losers' means for each predetermined individual characteristic
and the win/loss difference for a subsample of applicants from District 2, where students'
6th grade test scores are available. For 87 percent of the applicants from District 2, I
find their 6th grade test score by matching their name, gender, and primary school to the
district's test score records." In both samples, lottery winners and losers were balanced
on all the predetermined characteristics. There is no evidence that the lotteries favored
qualified applicants or applicants with higher pre-lottery test scores. As a further check of
9 No qualified applicants participated in the other 13 lotteries.
0oNonmatching is largely due to name misspelling or gender misidentification in either the lottery records
or the 6th grade test score records. Students' 6th grade test scores, which were coded from the school
district's handwritten records, might be subject to some degree of data entry error.
the randomness, I compare the winning rates by primary schools for schools with more than
20 applicants participating in a lottery to the winning rate of this lottery for the full sample.
In only 9 (4.3 percent) out of the 207 comparisons does the winning rate of the primary
school differ from the lottery winning rate at the five percent level.
Individual information in the lottery data is used to match lottery participants to admin-
istrative records of the HSEE database, which includes student information on middle school
enrollment, HSEE test scores, and secondary school admission status. All middle school grad-
uates are required to take the HSEE as it also serves as the middle school graduation exam.
Unfortunately, the lottery records do not contain perfect identification information that can
guarantee unique tracking of students in the HSEE database. Specifically, I can only use the
combination of an applicant's name and gender to search for matches in the HSEE records,
which sometimes leads to multiple matches due to common names. As dropping out and
repeating a grade were almost nonexistent in middle school and students rarely commuted
across river to attend middle school, I limit the matching search to the HSEE records of the
corresponding cohort that graduated from middle school in the North Bank three years after
each lottery.11
Panel B of Table 1-1 reports the matching statistics by lottery status within the universe
of all middle school graduates from the North Bank. The overall match rate is high, though
not perfect: about 90 percent of the lottery participants are matched to HSEE records,
including 68 percent uniquely matched and 85 percent matched to no more than five records.
11Expanding the source data to middle school graduates from the entire city only reduces the nonmatch
rate by about two percentage points, suggesting that very few applicants opt for middle school in the West
Bank and South Bank. However, expanding the source data significantly increases the probability of multiple
matches. In this paper, I only report the results using matched records in the North Bank. But the main
results remain similar if I instead use matched records in the entire city.
I estimate the empirical results of this chapter using the single-matched sample and the
combined single- and multi-matched sample consisting of applicants with up to five matches
in the HSEE records, respectively. When an applicant has two to five matches in the HSEE
database, I assign the applicant the mean value of the multi-matched HSEE records and a
weight that is equal to the number of matches. However, I exclude applicants matched to
more than five HSEE records out of concern that noise due to matching errors may outweigh
information for those individuals.
The missing outcomes can be due to either name misspelling, gender misidentification,
families moving out of the city, or students opting for middle schools outside the North Bank
(i.e., middle schools in the West Bank and South Bank or private middle schools outside the
city). Though sample attrition due to the first three reasons is likely to be exogenous to the
randomly determined lottery status, whether a student would opt for schooling outside the
North Bank may depend on her lottery outcome. Column 2 shows that winning a lottery
increased the likelihood of being matched by two percentage points, suggesting that a small
fraction of applicants - who would have opted for schooling outside the North Bank had
they lost their lottery - were induced to enroll in the North Bank after winning their lottery.
As the degree of differential attrition was very small in practical terms, I first present the
main results in Sections 1.4 and 1.5 by comparing the matched winners and losers under the
assumption that the differential sample attrition was nonselective, i.e., the characteristics of
the small group of applicants whose enrollment status in the North Bank depended on their
lottery status did not differ from those who would enroll in the North Bank, irrespective of
their lottery status. I then discuss in Section 1.6 the magnitude and the likely sign of the
potential biases due to the differential sample attrition between the winners and losers.
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1.4 Impact on Magnet School Enrollment and Peer
Achievement
1.4.1 The First-stage Effect on Magnet School Enrollment
Let i = 1,..., N index students, j = 1, ..., J index magnet schools, and t = 1, .., T index
years (cohorts). For each of the J x T independently conducted lotteries, I can estimate
a lottery-specific first-stage effect 6j t that measures the impact of winning the admission
lottery of magnet school j in year t on the probability of enrolling in that magnet school:
6jt = E[SilDi = 1, Al = jt] - E[SID = 0, Ai = jt] (1.1)
where Si is a dummy variable denoting applicant i's enrollment status in the magnet school
she applied to, Di is a binary variable denoting whether applicant i won her lottery, and Ai
is a categorical variable denoting which lottery applicant i participated in. Note that each
applicant in the sample participated in one and only one of the J x T lotteries.
For ease of interpretation, I estimate a regression-adjusted single-parameter first-stage
effect of winning a lottery on enrolling in the magnet school of one applied to by the following
model:
J T
Si = 6D% + EETjl(Ai = jt) + Ei (1.2)
j=1 t=1
where 1(Ai = jt) is an indicator for student i having participated in the admission lottery
of magnet school j in year t, jt is a lottery fixed effect, and e, is a stochastic error term.
As shown in Cullen et al. (2006), the coefficient 5 can be expressed as a weighted average
of 's wih he P(-P) where Nt is the number of participants inof 6t's with the weight wjt = Cj~ Et NjtPjt(1-Pjt)
lottery jt and Pit is the winning rate of lottery jt.
Columns 1 and 5 of Table 1-2 present the ordinary least squares regression estimates
of Equation (1.2) using the single-matched applicants of the full sample and the District 2
sample, respectively. The top row reports the "back door" entry rates among the lottery
losers (P[S = 1IDi = 0]). Over one-half (53 percent) of the lottery losers in the full sample
managed to get into the magnet school they applied to through the "back door." Despite
the high baseline enrollment rate among the lottery losers, winning a lottery still had a
substantial first-stage effect in the full sample: increasing the probability of enrolling in the
magnet school for which the lottery was held by 33 percentage points. Compared to the
full sample, the District 2 sample had a lower "back door" admission rate (only two-fifths of
the lottery losers were enrolled in their choice magnet school), and a correspondingly higher
first-stage effect of winning a lottery on enrolling in the magnet school one applied to (about
49 percentage points).
Selection in "Back Door" Entry
Columns 2 and 6 of Table 1-2 report the OLS regression estimates for specifications that
include covariates - such as gender, qualification status, and pre-lottery test scores, if avail-
able - and their interactions with the lottery status for the single-matched applicants of the
full sample and the District 2 sample, respectively. Results using the full sample show that
being a qualified applicant increased the "back door" entry rate by about seven percentage
points, suggesting evidence of positive selection on student ability via "back door" admission.
Results of the District 2 sample confirm the positive "back door" selection: a one standard
deviation increase in the pre-lottery test score raised the probability that a lottery loser
would attend the magnet school she applied to by five percentage points. After controlling
for students' pre-lottery test scores, the marginal impact of being a qualified applicant on
the "back door" entry rate remained positive, though statistically insignificant. Figure 1-3-A
plots the Kernel density curves of the pre-lottery test scores for the single-matched lottery
losers in District 2 by their enrollment status at the magnet school of their choice. Lottery
losers who attended the magnet school they applied to through the "back door" had higher
pre-lottery test scores (with a mean of 0.42 SD) than those who did not (with a mean of
0.25 SD).
The take-up rate among lottery winners was about 90 percent, indicating that ten percent
of the winners gave up their admission offer. Next, I check whether lottery winners who gave
up their option to attend a magnet school differed from those who exercised their option
in their pre-lottery achievement. Figure 1-3-B plots the Kernel density curves of the pre-
lottery test scores for lottery winners in District 2 by their take-up status. The two-sample
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (with a p-value of 0.948) cannot reject the equality of the two
distributions.
Columns 3-4 and 7-8 of Table 1-2 report the weighted (by number of matches) least
squares regression estimates using applicants with one to five matches of the full sample and
the District 2 sample, respectively. The results are qualitatively the same and quantitatively
very similar to those obtained using the single-matched applicants only.
1.4.2 Impact on Peer Achievement
According to the evidence from District 2 (the only district where primary school test scores
are available), there were several channels through which winning a lottery could improve
peers' test scores: (1) qualified applicants admitted by advance admission had very high 6th-
grade test scores (with a mean of 0.68 SD); (2) participants in the main admission lottery
also had above-average 6th grade test scores (with a mean of 0.31 SD); and (3) lottery losers
who attended magnet schools through the "back door" had a higher average 6th-grade test
score than lottery losers who did not attend (0.42 SD vs. 0.25 SD).
In the following, I examine the impact of winning a lottery on the achievement of a
student's peers measured by their test scores on the HSEE. Let Y(-i)gt stand for the peer
mean HSEE test score of student i, i.e., the average HSEE test score of the cohort t of the
middle school g that student i attended excluding her own test score. 12 The effect of winning
a lottery on peer achievement Y(-i)jt is estimated using the following regression model:
J T
Y(-i)gt = aD + X I 1 + ZZ pjtl(Ai = jt) + higt (1.3)
j=1 t=1
where X! is a vector of the predetermined characteristics of the applicant, such as gender,
qualification status in application, and pre-lottery test scores, if available; pjt is a lottery
fixed effect; and qigt is a stochastic error. For all the HSEE takers from the North Bank
every year, their test scores are standardized to have zero mean and unit variance.
12 In practice, I do not have the HSEE test scores for all students in the North Bank, but instead obtained
a 3.5 percent random sample of all HSEE takers from the North Bank. For most of the lottery participants
not in the random sample, their mean peer achievement is estimated as the average among all students in the
random sample who belong to the cohort of the middle school of their enrollment; while for a small fraction
of lottery participants who happen to be in the random sample, their own HSEE test scores are excluded
when calculating their mean peer achievement.
Table 1-3 shows the impact of winning a lottery on the school-grade-level average peer
achievement on the HSEE. In the full sample, winning a lottery increased the school-grade-
level average peer achievement on the HSEE by about 0.11 SD (from the losers' mean of
0.19 SD); while for the District 2 sample, winning a lottery increased the average peer
achievement on the HSEE by about 0.19 SD (from the losers' mean of 0.10 SD). Lottery
losers from District 2 had a lower mean peer achievement than those from other districts
for two reasons. First, District 2 is a relatively disadvantaged inner-city district in terms of
students' average HSEE test scores. Second, the "back door" entry rate among lottery losers
was lower in District 2 than in the other two districts in the North Bank. However, because
of the relatively larger first-stage effect of winning a lottery on magnet school enrollment
in District 2, the win/loss difference in the peer mean HSEE test scores was larger in the
District 2 sample than in the full sample.
1.5 Impact on Student Outcomes
1.5.1 The Intent-to-Treat Effect on Student Outcomes
In an ideal random assignment of treatment with no missing outcomes, winners and losers
of a particular lottery are balanced, on average, in terms of both their observable and unob-
servable characteristics. Consequently, a simple difference between the observed outcomes
of the winners and losers of a particular lottery provides a consistent estimate of the intent-
to-treat (ITT) effect: the impact of being offered the option to attend that magnet school
for students who applied to it in that year. Let Y denote an outcome measure of student i.
Then the ITT effect of winning magnet school j's lottery in year t can be expressed as:
7rjt = E[Y[Di = 1, Ai = jt] - E[Y ID = 0, A = jt] (1.4)
where Ai is a categorical variable denoting which lottery applicant i participated in. The
parameter 7rjt is of direct interest if the focus is the impact of having magnet school j in the
choice set of students of cohort t who expressed an interest in it. The regression-adjusted
ITT effect of winning a lottery on student outcome Y can be estimated using the following
regression model:
JT
Y = rD + Xi 2 + Z t jtl(Ai = jt) + vi (1.5)
j=1 t=1
In this study, I construct five measures of students' ex post academic outcomes based
on their performance on the HSEE and their secondary school enrollment status: total test
scores on the HSEE, a dummy for scoring above the threshold for elite high school admission,
a dummy for being admitted by an elite high school, a dummy for scoring above the threshold
for regular high school admission, and a dummy for being admitted by any high school. Every
year, the city education council announces the minimum score requirements for attending a
regular high school and an elite high school, respectively. The two thresholds were usually
around the 40th percentile and the 70th percentile of the HSEE test scores of that year.' 3
13In addition to these two thresholds, the city education council also sets minimum score requirement
for different subcategories of vocational secondary schools. Each senior secondary school then announces a
guaranteed admission score that cannot be lower than the threshold the city education council sets for the
category it belongs to. After knowing their own HSEE test scores and the guaranteed admission scores of their
interested schools, students then submit their ranked preferences for secondary schools - high schools and
vocational secondary schools. As the eventual admission score of a school might be lower than its announced
guaranteed admission score, students might be strategic in ranking their preferences. The admission process
If winning a lottery could improve students' (elite) high school enrollment status through
channels beyond raising their HSEE test scores, we would expect a larger ITT effect on
enrollment status than on scoring above the corresponding threshold.
Panels A through E of Table 1-4 present the losers' means and the ITT effects of winning
a lottery for each of these five outcome measures. Each column reports an estimated ITT
effect using a separate sample. Despite the significant and substantial positive effects of
winning a lottery on magnet school attendance and peer achievement, I find little evidence
that winning a lottery improved students' academic outcomes three years later. None of the
20 ITT coefficient estimates are significant at the 10 percent level, with 13 coefficients being
estimated to be negative (though statistically insignificant). The ITT coefficient estimates of
the full sample can reject a positive effect of 0.05 SD on the HSEE test scores and a gain of
three percentage points for any of the other four binary outcome measures at the five percent
level. The ITT effects on being admitted by an elite high school do not seem to be larger
than the effects on scoring above the threshold for elite high school admission, suggesting no
evidence that winning a lottery improved students' enrollment status at elite high schools
through any nonacademic channel. The same conclusion holds when examining (elite and
regular) high school enrollment status in general. The ITT coefficients using the District
2 sample are less precisely estimated, but are qualitatively similar to the results using the
full sample. Estimates using the District 2 sample indicate that much of the variation in
students' HSEE test scores can be explained by their 6th grade test score difference: a one-
standard-deviation rise in the 6th grade test score would lead to a 0.61 SD increase in the
is computerized and under direct control of the admission office of the city education council. Even though
"back door" admission is not eliminated, it plays a much smaller role in high school admission than it does
in middle school admission.
HSEE test score.
1.5.2 Instrumental Variable Estimates of Magnet School Effects
Section 1.5.1 focuses on the ITT effects of winning a lottery on student academic outcomes.
The lottery results, however, were not completely binding. As discussed in Section 1.4, a
substantial fraction of lottery losers (about one-half) attended the magnet schools they chose
through the "back door", while a small fraction (about one-tenth) of lottery winners did not
exercise their choice option. Using applicants' lottery status as an instrument, this section
presents the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimates of the effects of attending a magnet
school on students' academic outcomes. Under the exclusion assumption that winning a
lottery only affected students' outcomes through its effect on their enrollment status in the
magnet school they chose, the 2SLS regression estimates the following model:
J T
Y = +ySi + X'3 + E jt(A = jt) + yj (1.6)
j=1 t=1
The associated first-stage relationship instruments the enrollment status at the magnet school
they chose (Si) using their lottery status (Di):
J T
Si = OjtD + Xi04 + Z Tj1tl(Ai = jt) + vi (1.7)
j=1 t=1
In addition to including a vector of individual characteristics Xj as controls, Equation (1.7)
differs from equation (1.2) in that equation (1.7) allows the first-stage effect to vary across
lotteries, while equation (1.2) estimates a single parameter for the weighted average first-
stage effect.
Table 1-5 presents both the OLS and 2SLS estimates of the effects of attending the
magnet school students applied to on the five outcome measures discussed in Section 1.5.1.
The general picture of the OLS results is that applicants who attended the magnet school
they chose outperformed those who did not. All the ten OLS coefficient estimates are
positive and statistically significant at the 10 percent level, with eight being significant
at the one percent level. Because of the positive selection on student ability via "back
door" admission as discussed earlier, the OLS estimates of magnet school enrollment effects
are biased upward. Following the previous literature on treatment effects under imperfect
compliance (e.g., Imbens and Angrist, 1994), the 2SLS estimates of - should be interpreted
as the local average treatment effects (LATE) of attending a magnet school on the academic
outcomes for a subgroup of lottery winners who would not have attended magnet schools
had they lost their lottery. Similar to the results of the ITT coefficient estimates, none
of the 20 2SLS coefficients (estimated for the five outcome variables using four samples) is
significant, suggesting no evidence of any significant effect of attending a magnet school on
students' academic outcomes after controlling for selection via "back door" entry. Though
statistically insignificant, the 2SLS estimates of the treatment effects on the HSEE test scores
are negative for all of the four samples. The point estimates and standard errors of these
four samples all allow me to reject a modest gain of 0.1 SD in HSEE test scores at the five
percent level.
Table 1-6 shows the quantile regressions and the quantile treatment effects of attending
a magnet school on students' HSEE test scores. The quantile regression indicates that
applicants who attended a magnet school had higher HSEE test scores than those who did
not for all deciles, with the gap by enrollment status around the median being larger than
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that at the lower or upper tail. The quantile treatment effects are estimated using lottery
status as an instrument based on the methodology presented in Abadie et al. (2002). There is
some suggestive evidence that low-achieving students might have been worse off by attending
these high-achieving magnet schools. But there is no evidence that students at the upper
tail of the test score distribution benefited by attending these magnet schools.
1.6 Accounting for Differential Attrition
As discussed in Section 1.3, the outcome data are subject to a small degree of differential
sample attrition between the winners and losers in the study. A small fraction of applicants
- who would have opted for schooling outside the North Bank had they lost their lottery -
were induced to enroll in the North Bank after winning their lottery. If the characteristics
of these applicants (whose outcomes would be observed only if they had won their lottery)
differed from those whose outcomes would be observed, irrespective of their lottery status,
the main empirical results presented above would be biased.
In the following, I outline a framework using the easily analyzed difference in the means
of the observed winner and loser samples to examine the magnitude and the likely sign of
the potential biases in the estimated ITT effects due to the differential sample attrition.
The framework is similar in spirit to earlier work on treatment effect analysis with missing
outcomes (e.g., Manski, 1990; Lee, 2002).' 4 Let Tli and Toi be the latent dummy variables
denoting whether the outcome of an applicant is tracked when Di = 1 and Di = 0, re-
'
4 The framework presented in the paper only considers the first-order issue of differential sample attrition
between the lottery winners and losers and ignores the interaction between matching errors and differential
sample attrition.
spectively. For example, Ti = 1 and Toi = 0 imply that the outcome would be tracked if
Di = 1, but would not be tracked if Di = 0. Let Yli and Yoi be the potential outcomes of
interest when Di = 1 and Di = 0, respectively. In practice, we observe (Yi, T, Di), where
T = Toi + (Tli - Toi)Di; Y = Yoi + (Yi - Yo)Dj if T = 1; and Y is missing if T = 0.
Following the existing literature, I assume that winning a lottery has a monotone impact on
sample selection.
Axiom 1 Winning a lottery, if it affects sample selection at all, only induce some individuals
who otherwise would drop out of the sample to stay in the sample, but not the opposite.
Ti > Toi
The monotonicity assumption excludes the possibility that an applicant would be induced
to drop out of the sample because of winning a lottery, but still allows Pr(Tli = 1, Toi = 0)
to be positive, i.e., some individuals might be induced to stay in the sample after winning
a lottery. The difference between the means of the observed treatment and control groups
can be expressed as:
E[YI ITi = 1] - E[Yol|To = 1] = E[YuI Toi = 1] Pr[Toi = 1ITj1 = 1] +
E[Yi~IT = 1, Toi = 0] Pr[Toi = 0ITui = 1] - E[YolToi = 1]
= E[Y
~ 
- YoilToi = 1] + {E[YlIT = 1, Toi = 0] - E[YilToi = 1]} Pr[Toi = OIjT = 1]
parameter of interest (1
(1.8)
where the first component E[Yi -Yo IToi = 1] is the parameter of interest - the ITT effect of a
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subpopulation whose outcomes would be observed, irrespective of their treatment assignment
status - and the second component ( ,) is the bias of using the observed difference between
the tracked winners and losers (E[YI Ti2T = 1] - E[Yo IToj = 1]) as an estimate of E[Y, -
Yoi Toi = 1].
Given the small degree of differential sample attrition (Pr[Toi = OITi = 1] . 3%), the
bias of using the difference in the means of observed winners and losers as an estimate of
the ITT effect of the Toi = 1 subpopulation is likely to be very small. In addition, I examine
whether and to what extent the contamination group (Toi = 0, T12 = 1) differed from the
group of interest (Toi = 1) in terms of students' pre-lottery test scores for applicants from
District 2. This is a highly relevant test, as students' ex post academic outcomes were highly
correlated with their pre-lottery test scores (see Section 1.5.1). In order to conduct the
comparison, I impose a second assumption:
Axiom 2 The unidentified sampling error in the pre-lottery test scores (xi) for the To, = 1
subpopulation is the same as the sampling error for the entire population (which is identified):
E[xziID = 1, Toi = 1] - E[xjID, = 0, Toi = 1] = E[xIDj = 1] - E[xjIDj = 0]
Table 1-7 shows that, among the observed winners, the contamination group (D =
1, Toi = 0, T1i = 1) had an average 6th grade test score that was 0.53 SD higher than the
average of the subpopulation of interest (Di = 1, Toi = 1), and the difference is statisti-
cally significant. This indicates that the estimated ITT effects and the corresponding 2SLS
estimates of the treatment effects are likely to be biased upward. The magnitude of the
potential upward bias, however, is very small. Given the point estimate of the impact of
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the pre-lottery test score on the HSEE test score (0.60) and the degree of differential sample
attrition (0.03), the magnitude of the bias in the estimated ITT effect on the HSEE test
scores is on the order of 0.01 SD (.53 x .60 x 03), a size that is almost negligible.
1.7 Parental School Choice
Given the high tuition cost and the lack of systematic academic benefits, why is competition
for entry into these magnet schools so intense? One possibility is that parents and students
may prefer these magnet schools for reasons other than academic performance, such as
physical environments, classroom discipline, and peer behavior. Anecdotal evidence does
indicate that magnet schools are superior in such nonacademic school attributes compared
to neighborhood middle schools. Considering the rigorous exam-based high school admission
in China, it is hence unlikely that Chinese parents choose magnet schools primarily out of
concern for these nonacademic attributes of magnet schools.
Another possibility is that parents place high value on average student achievement when
choosing a school, either because they value peer quality beyond its effect on value added,
or because they confuse average achievement with value added. Even though the empirical
evidence cannot distinguish these two underlying reasons, either of them being true would
lead schools to be sought for their observed student achievement. I construct two popularity
measures for these magnet schools: lottery winning rates and winner take-up rates. Table
1-8 presents school-level mean statistics on the HSEE test scores (column 3), estimated value
added effects (column 4), lottery winning rates (column 5), winner take-up rates (column
6), loser "back door" entry rates (column 7), and first-stage effects on enrollment (column
8) for all the eight magnet schools in the North Bank. Figures 1-4-A and 1-4-B show the
two popularity measures plotted against schools' average HSEE test scores, respectively.
Results demonstrate that the highly popular magnet schools are those with high student
achievement on the HSEE, suggesting that parents might indeed use achievement measures
to guide their school choice. Columns 1 and 4 in Table 1-9 report the OLS regressions of
the lottery winning rates and the winner take-up rates on the average student achievement,
respectively. The estimates confirm the results shown in Figures 1-4-A and 1-4-B. Columns
3 and 6 further show that the impact of average student achievement on school popularity
remains marginally significant even after controlling for the value added measure I estimate
for each magnet school.
One explanation is that parents may value peer quality beyond its effect on test scores.
It could be that parents place high intrinsic weight on value added, but modest intrinsic
weight on peer quality (beyond its effect on value added), in choosing a school. However,
because value added effects are very imprecisely measured, while peer quality can be observed
accurately, the high intrinsic weight on value added is swamped by the noisy measure,
resulting in schools being chosen mainly for their observed peer quality.
Another explanation is that, given the lack of any reliable value added measure, parents
may instead use the easily obtainable achievement measure as a proxy for value added (Figlio
and Lucas, 2004). Using achievement to proxy for value added is not a big problem if the
former is indeed a good proxy for the latter, i.e., the two measures are highly positively
correlated. Figure 1-5 plots the estimated value added effects against schools' average HSEE
test scores for these magnet schools and shows that the two measures are largely uncorrelated
(with a correlation coefficient of 0.08). This echoes the previous finding of a weak correlation
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between school grades and value added in the U.S. school accountability literature (see Kane
and Staiger, 2002, for a survey). Figures 1-6-A and 1-6-B show the two popularity measures
plotted against the estimated value added effects, respectively. If parents indeed preferred
and were able to identify high value added schools, we would expect to see higher value
added magnet schools to have lower lottery winning rates but higher take-up rates of lottery
winners. Figure 1-6-A shows a positive correlation between lottery winning rates and schools'
value added effects, opposite to what one would otherwise expect. Figure 1-6-B also shows
little evidence that the take-up rates of lottery winners are higher for schools with higher
value added - the correlation between the two measures is 0.07. These results are consistent
with an explanation that parents using the easily obtainable achievement measure to proxy
for value added fail to identify schools with higher value added when the quality of the proxy
is poor.
1.8 Conclusion
This chapter evaluates the impact of attending a magnet school in China on student achieve-
ment by exploiting random school admissions lotteries in Wuhan. Magnet school graduates
had much higher HSEE test scores compared to those graduated from neighborhood middle
schools. However, the cross-sectional superiority is likely to be spurious, largely attributable
to student selection in lottery participation and "back door" entry, as well as the advance
admission policy that favored the gifted and talented students. Despite that lottery winners
had access to a better peer group, better qualified teachers, and a school of their choice (and
hence might better suit their learning needs), I find little evidence that winning a lottery is
associated with any academic benefit to students. The point estimates of the two-stages least
squares (2SLS) regressions of students' HSEE test scores on their magnet school enrollment
status using lottery results as an instrument are all insignificant, and allow me to reject a
modest gain of 0.1 standard deviation (SD) at the five percent level.
I find that magnet school popularity, measured by either the competitiveness of the
admission lottery or the take-up rate of lottery winners, is highly positively correlated with
the average student achievement, but largely unrelated to the treatment effect on student
achievement that I estimate for each school. This evidence suggests that parents value
peer quality beyond its effect on achievement gains, or confuse average student achievement
with value added. The finding that magnet schools are sought mainly for their observed
superiority in average student achievement rather than for their academic value added casts
doubt on the potential of school choice to improve student achievement, at least in this
context.
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Table 1-1 Predetermined Individual Characteristics and Matching Outcomes, by Lottery Statuslal
All Districts District 2
Win/loss Win/loss
Dependent Variable Losers' mean difference Losers' mean difference
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A Predetermined Individual Characteristics
Female 0.475 -0.011 0.500 -0.022
(0.010) (0.021)
Qualified applicant [b  0.190 -0.020 0.209 0.004
(0.012) (0.018)
6th grade test score available - 0.864 -0.002
(0.015)
6th grade combined Chinese and 0.287 0.034
mathematics score (in s.d.) (0.037)
Panel B Matching Outcomes
Overall match rate 0.893 0.022 *** 0.905 0.017
(0.006) (0.012)
Single match 0.676 - 0.652
2 to 5 matches 0.170 - 0.189
Number of observationsc l  9,630 13,769 2,730 3,484
Notes: [a] The table reports the losers' means for each dependent variable indicated by the row heading and the
coefficients of separate regressions of each dependent variable on an indicator variable for winning a lottery
and a full set of lottery fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. A triple asterisk (***) denotes
significant at the 1 percent level.
[b] Observations used in this row only include participants of the lotteries that had involved qualified
applicants.
[c] Number of observations shows the maximum sample size in each column.
Table 1-2 First-Stage Effect on Enrollment in the Choice Magnet Schoollal
Full Sample District 2 Sample
Single-matched Single-matched
applicants All matched applicants applicants All matched applicants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Fraction of lottery losers enrolled in 0.534 0.396
their choice magnet schoolb]
Won lottery 0.334 ** 0.281 *** 0.342 ** 0.293 *** 0.494 *** 0.496 ** 0.506 *** 0.479***
(0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.012) (0.018) (0.044) (0.017) (0.040)
Female -0.012 -0.019 * 0.008 -0.002
(0.011) (0.011) (0.023) (0.020)
Won lottery * female -0.005 -0.012 -0.042 -0.016
(0.016) (0.016) (0.036) (0.034)
Qualified applicant 0.070 *** 0.085 *** 0.040 0.059 **
(0.023) (0.021) (0.033) (0.030)
Won lottery * qualified applicants -0.022 -0.036 -0.008 0.010
(0.037) (0.037) (0.047) (0.053)
Pre-lottery test score (in s.d.) 0.054 *** 0.049 ***
(0.014) (0.013)
Won lottery * pre-lottery test score -0.063 *** -0.061 ***
(0.024) (0.020)
Number of observations 9,424 11,734 1,990 2,661
Notes: [a] The table reports the coefficients of OLS regressions of a binary dependent variable denoting whether a student was enrolled in her choice magnet
school on an indicator variable of winning a lottery, a full set of lottery fixed effects as well as covariates and their interactions with the lottery status as
indicated by the row headings. An interaction between a dummy variable denoting whether the lottery involved qualified applicants and lottery status is
also included in columns (2), (3), (4), and (5) so that the coefficients on the interaction between qualified applicant dummy and lottery status does not
include across-lottery variation in the first-stage effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. A triple asterisk (***) denotes significant at the 1
percent level; a double asterisk (**) denotes significant at the 5 percent level; a single asterisk (*) denotes significant at the 10 percent level.
[b] Only the losers' means of the dependent variable of the single-matched samples are reported. The losers' means of the multi-matched applicants are
uninformative because of the matching errors due to common names.
Table 1-3 The Impact of Winning a Lottery on Peer Achievement, Single-matched Applicantslal
Full Sample District 2 Sample
(1) (2)
Dependent variable: School-grade-level peer mean HSEE test score
Won lottery 0.110 *** 0.188 *
(0.029) (0.078)
Female -0.002 -0.012
(0.006) (0.016)
Qualified applicant 0.060 ** 0.060
(0.026) (0.041)
Pre-lottery test scores (in s.d.) 0.035 **
(0.016)
Losers' mean in the dependent variable 0.190 0.103
Number of observations[ b  9,394 1,982
Notes: [a] The table reports the coefficients of the OLS regressions of the leave-one-out peer mean HSEE
test score at the middle school-grade one attended on an indicator variable of winning a lottery,
gender, qualification status, and pre-lottery test score, if available, and a full set of lottery fixed
effects, as well as lottery losers' means in the dependent variable. Robust standard deviations are in
parentheses. Standard errors are corrected for the within-school-grade-of-enrollment clustering. A
triple asterisk (***) denotes significant at the 1 percent level; a double asterisk (**) denotes
significant at the 5 percent level.
[b] The sample sizes are slightly smaller as the peer mean achievement is missing for a very small
fraction (less than one percent) of the single-matched application.
Table 1-4 Reduced-form Effect of Winning a Lotterylal
Full Sample District 2 Sample
Single-matched All matched Single-matched All matched
applicants applicants applicants applicants
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A HSEE test score
Losers' mean in the dep var[b]  0.247 0.137
(0.999) (1.009)
Won lottery effect -0.009 -0.004 -0.064 -0.036
(0.024) (0.026) (0.061) (0.090)
[-.059, .040] [-.058, .050] [-.220, .092] [-.266, .195]
Pre-lottery test scores (in s.d.) 0.607 ** 0.637 ***
(0.013) (0.030)
[.574, .640] [.560, .714]
Panel B Scoring above the threshold for elite high school admission
Losers' mean in the dep var 0.415 0.354
(0.493) (0.478)
Won lottery effect -0.001 0.001 -0.013 0.003
(0.009) (0.014) (0.015) (0.024)
[-.019, .018] [-.029, .032] [-.053, .026] [-.060, .066]
Panel C Being admitted by an elite high school
Losers' mean in the dep var 0.310 0.262
(0.463) (0.440)
Won lottery effect 0.008 0.006 -0.005 0.001
(0.010) (0.018) (0.018) (0.025)
[-.012, .028] [-.031, .044] [-.052, .043] [-.064, .066]
Panel D Scoring above the threshold for regular high school admission
Losers' mean in the dep var 0.665 0.624
(0.472) (0.485)
Won lottery effect -0.005 -0.011 -0.016 0.033
(0.013) (0.021) (0.039) (0.052)
[-.033, .023] [-.056, .034] [-.116, .084] [-.101, .166]
Panel E Being admitted by any high school
Losers' mean in the dep var 0.680 0.611
(0.466) (0.037)
Won lottery effect -0.008 -0.015 -0.030 0.004
(0.013) (0.021) (0.037) (0.056)
[-.035, .018] [-.058, .028] [-.126, .066] [-.141, .149]
Number of observations 9,424 12,102 1,990 2,743
Notes: [a] Each panel of the table reports losers' means in the dependent variable as indicated by the panel headings and
the the OLS regression estimates of the effect of winning a lottery on the dependent variable from models that
include controls for gender, qualification status, and pre-lottery test score, if available, and a full set of lottery fixed
effects. The estimated coefficients of the pre-lottery test scores are only reported in Panel A. Each column presents
the estimates of a separate sample. Numbers in paratheses are standard deviations in rows of means and robust
standard errors clustered by lotteries in rows of estimated won lottery effects. Numbers in brackets are the 95
percent confidence intervals. A triple asterisk (***) denotes significant at the 1 percent level.
[b] Only the losers' means of the dependent variable of the single-matched samples are reported. The losers' means
of the multi-matched applicants are uninformative because of the matching errors due to common names.
Table 1-5 OLS and 2SLS Estimates of the Effect of Attending the Choice Magnet Schoollal
Full Sample District 2 Sample
Dependent variable Losers'
means OLS 2SLSa 2SLSb OLS 2SLSa 2SLSb
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
HSEE test score (in s.d.) 0.247 0.127*** -0.023 -0.037 0.092 ** -0.099 -0.103
(0.999) (0.022) (0.058) (0.068) (0.038) (0.085) (0.104)
Scoring above the threshold for elite high 0.415 0.078 *** 0.012 0.008 0.078 *** -0.007 -0.012
school admission (0.493) (0.011) (0.028) (0.033) (0.020) (0.042) (0.051)
Being admitted by an elite high school 0.310 0.053 *** 0.026 0.005 0.048 *** 0.007 -0.018
(0.463) (0.010) (0.026) (0.030) (0.019) (0.039) (0.044)
Scoring above the threshold for regular high 0.665 0.049 *** -0.013 -0.027 0.033 * -0.017 0.024
school admission (0.472) (0.011) (0.029) (0.047) (0.020) (0.043) (0.082)
Being admitted by any high school 0.680 0.063 *** -0.033 -0.052 0.057 *** -0.047 -0.026
(0.466) (0.011) (0.029) (0.046) (0.020) (0.044) (0.080)
Number of observations 6,510 9,424 9,424 11,734 1,990 1,990 2,661
Notes.. [a] The table reports the OLS and IV estimates of the effect of attending the selected magnet school on each dependent variable indicated
in the row heading. Each column presents the estimates of a separate sample. For columns 1 to 4, the exogenous control variables include
gender, qualification status, and a full set of lottery fixed effect. For columns 5 to 8, the exogenous control variables include the pre-
lottery test score, in addition to those used in columns 1 to 4. For all the IV estimates, the specifications allow the first-stage effect of
winning a lottery on attendance at the selected magnet school to vary across lotteries. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. A tripe
asterisk (***) denotes significant at the 1 percent level; a double asterisk (**) denotes significant at the 5 percent level; and a single
asterisk (*) denotes significant at the 10 percent level.
Table 1-6 Quantile Regressions and IV Estimates of the Quantile Treatment Effects, Single-matched Applicatnsl[a
(Dependent Variable: HSEE Test Scores in SD's)
Quantile
OLS/2SLS 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
OLS/Quantile Regression
Enrollment 0.116 0.142 0.099 0.114 0.196 0.170 0.169 0.156 0.118 0.092
(0.051) (0.043) (0.042) (0.032) (0.033) (0.034) (0.026) (0.023) (0.022) (0.019)
YO 0.12 -1.22 -0.70 -0.30 -0.04 0.27 0.54 0.80 1.06 1.32
2SLS/Quantile Treatment Effect
Enrollment -0.122 -0.115 -0.215 -0.203 -0.170 -0.142 -0.099 -0.066 -0.049 -0.028
(0.117) (0.142) (0.123) (0.112) (0.118) (0.109) (0.108) (0.090) (0.084) (0.077)
YO 0.12 -1.19 -0.68 -0.30 -0.02 0.26 0.54 0.78 1.05 1.33
Note: [a] Lottery status is used as an instrument for enrollment in estimating the quantile treatment effect. Other control variables include gender,
qualification status and lottery fixed effects. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. The quantile coefficients and standard errors
are estimated using the program code used in Abadie, Angrist, and Imbens (2002).
Table 1-7 The Sign of Potential Biases
xi s.d. s.e.
Ex jID= 01 0.287 (0.860)
E[zxID= 1] - E[x;|D 1= 01 0.034 (0.037)
E[x D= 0, To0= 1] 0.294 (0.864)
E[xD= 0, Tj,= 1] - E[xD,= 0, To,= 1] 0.046 (0.037)
E[xjID,= 1, To,= 1] 0.328
E[xijDj= 1, To~= 0, Tj1 = 11 0.854
E[xjlD,= 1, TO= 0, T,= 1]-E[xL2 D,= 1, T,= 1] 0.527 (0.238)
Table 1-8 School Level Statistics [a]
District
(2)
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
3
Estimated
Mean HSEE value added
score (LATE)
(3) (4)
0.447 -0.072
0.416 0.064
0.755 0.027
-0.061 0.214
-0.080 -0.299
0.430 -0.017
0.333 -0.216
0.035 -0.477
Lottery
winning rate
(5)
0.288
0.315
0.168
0.378
0.196
0.346
0.298
0.455
Fraction
enrolled,
winners
(6)
0.928
0.949
0.890
0.855
0.924
0.826
0.871
0.773
Fraction
enrolled,
losers
(7)
0.770
0.643
0.441
0.380
0.297
0.324
0.502
0.489
First-stage
effect
(8)
0.159
0.306
0.449
0.475
0.627
0.502
0.368
0.285
Notes: Column 3 reports the mean HSEE score of students who graduated from each magnet school during 2005-2007,
including those who were admitted during the advance admission. Column 4 reports the LATE estimate of the
value added effect of attending the magnet school on students' HSEE test scores. Columns 5 to 8 report the
mean statistics of applicants who participated the main admission lotteries.
School
index
(1)
la
lb
2c
2d
2e
3f
3g
3h
Table 1-9 The Effect of Achievement and Value Added on Popularity
Dependent Variable
Lottery winning rate Winner take-up rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
School mean HSEE test score (in s.d.) -0.174 * -0.193 0.083 * 0.083
(0.109) (0.110) (0.045) (0.048)
School value added measure (in s.d.) 0.102 0.137 0.015 0.000
(0.135) (0.126) (0.059) (0.055)
Number of observations 21 21 21 21 21 21
Notes. The table reports the OLS coefficient estimates of regression the dependent variable indicated by the column heading on the independent
variable(s) indicated by the row headings and a full set of district * year fixed effect. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. A single
asterisk denotes significant at the 10 percent level.
Figure 1-1 Map of Wuhan
Figure 1-2 Pre-lottery Test Score Distributions, District 2 Sample
Notes: Figure A plots the Kernel density curve of students' 6t grade combined test scores by their magnet school enrollment
status for students from District2. The Kolmogorov-Smirnmov two-sample test has a p-value of 0.000. Figure 2 plots the Kernel
density curve of the 6td grade combined test scores for advance admission recipients, main lottery participants, and
nonparticipants in District 2, respectively. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample tests show the three distributions are all
different to each other with a o-value of 0.000.
Figure 1-3 Pre-lottery Test Score Distributions by Lottery Status and Enrollment Status, District 2 Sample
Notes: Figure A plots the Kernel density curve of the 6h grade combined test scores for the single-matched lottery losers in
District 2 by their enrollment status in their choice magnet school. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test has a corrected p-
value of 0.000. Figure B plots the Kernel density curve of the 6 h grade combined test scores for the single-matched lottery
winners in District 2 by their enrollment status in their choice magnet school. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test has a
corrected p-value of 0.948.
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Figure 1-4 School Popularity and Student Achievement
Notes: Figure 4A plots the residual inverse lottery winning rate and the residual school average HSEE test score (excluding the
cohort of lottery participants) after controlling for full interactions of district and year fixed effects. Figure 6B plots the residual
winner take-up rates and the residual school average HSEE test scores (excluding the cohort of lottery participants) after
controlling for full interactions of district and year fixed effects.
Figure 1-5 Treatment Effects and Student Achievement
Notes: The graph plots the residual treatment effect and the residual school average HSEE test score (excluding the cohort
of lottery participants) after controlling for full interactions of district and year fixed effects.
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Figure 1-6 School Popularity and Treatment Effect
Notes: Figure 6A plots the residual inverse lottery winning rate and the residual treatment effect after controlling for full
interactions of district and year fixed effect. Figure 6B plots the residual winner take-up rate and the residual treatment effect
after controlling for full interactions of district and year fixed effect.
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Chapter 2
Peer Effects on Student Achievement:
Evidence from Middle School in China
2.1 Introduction
The effects of peer groups on students' academic performance play a prominent role in
various education policy debates. Many current education interventions - for example, school
choice, ability tracking, and affirmative action - have the potential to influence student
outcomes through their impacts on peer composition. Understanding the structure and
the magnitude of peer effects is therefore a critical ingredient in evaluating these policies.
However, despite the importance of peer influences for education policies, empirical research
has not yet reached a consensus on the existence and the nature of peer effects. While some
studies show large positive effects of peer quality on academic achievement (e.g., McEwan,
2003; Kang, 2007), others find small or insignificant effects (e.g., Angrist and Lang, 2004;
Lefgren, 2004).
The lack of consensus on peer influences reflects various challenges confronted by empiri-
cal research on peer effects (Manski, 1993; Moffitt, 2001; Brock and Durlauf, 2001). The first
challenge is to isolate peer effects from "correlated effects" due to the correlation between
peer composition and the omitted individual or institutional characteristics that can affect
student outcomes. The second challenge, known as the "reflection problem," arises from
the reciprocal nature of peer interactions: a student influences her peers and is also influ-
enced by her peers, which causes a classical simultaneity problem of econometrics. These
two challenges have engaged much of the attention of the peer effects literature and have
been treated intensively. The past decade has seen the development of a variety of empirical
strategies to identify exogenous sources of variation in peer characteristics to deal with the
endogeneity problem. These recent studies have exploited within-school (grade) variation
(e.g., Hoxby, 2000; Hanusheck et al., 2003; McEwan, 2003; Vigdor and Nechyba, 2004, 2006;
Lavy and Schlosser, 2007; Ammermueller and Pischke, 2009; Gould, Lavy, and Paserman,
forthcoming), within-student variation (e.g., Betts and Zau, 2004; Lavy, Silva, and Wein-
hardt, 2009), subgroup reassignment (e.g., Angrist and Lang, 2004; Hoxby and Weingarth,
2005), instrumental variables (IV) (e.g., Kang, 2007; Zabel, 2008), and random assignment
(e.g., Sacerdote, 2001; Zimmerman, 2003; Duflo, Dupas, and Kremer, 2007, 2008). Identify-
ing the structural parameters under the simultaneity problem, however, has proved difficult
or impossible without imposing severe restrictions on the econometric model.' The empirical
peer effects literature has often resorted to estimating the exogenous relationship between
'Necessary conditions for identification of the structural parameters can be found in Brock and Durlauf
(2001). Two principle methods for identification are either to introduce some type of nonlinearity into the
model (e.g., suppose individual behavior varies with other moments of group behavior) or to assume there
exists one individual variable whose group-level average has no direct influence on individual outcomes or
vice versa.
individual outcomes and predetermined measures of peer composition to circumvent the
reflection problem (Nechyba, 2006). While some studies have focused on the relationship
between exogenous peer characteristics (such as race, gender, and family background) and in-
dividual outcomes (e.g., Hoxby, 2000; Angrist and Lavy, 2004; Ammermueller and Pischke,
2009; Lavy and Schlosser, 2007; Gould, Lavy, and Paserman, forthcoming), other studies
have benefited from panel data to include lagged outcome measures rather than contempo-
rary values (e.g., Hanusheck et al., 2003; Ding and Lehrer, 2003; Vigdor and Nechyba, 2004,
2006; Lavy, Silva, and Weinhardt, 2009).2
In this chapter, we examine peer effects on students' math scores using a matched panel
data set from China. The data set consists of 7,435 students from three successive cohorts
of all the 15 middle schools in a school district and tracks their academic histories from
finishing primary school (grades 1-6) to completing middle school (grades 7-9). By taking
advantage of the panel data set, we address the reflection problem by focusing our inter-
est on the exogenous relationship between predetermined peer characteristics - gender and
lagged achievement in particular - and individual outcomes. We base the identification on
within-school, between-cohort variation in peer composition, thereby controlling for omitted
variables due to unobserved school characteristics and student sorting across schools. In
terms of the identification strategy, the papers closest to ours are the ones by Hoxby (2000)
and Gould, Lavy, and Paserman (forthcoming), both of which use comparisons in adjacent
cohorts' peer composition within schools. Our identification strategy is also similar in spirit
to studies that assume random classroom assignment within schools and use comparisons
2Hanushek et al. (2003) provide a thorough discussion of how this does and does not fully address the
reflection problem.
across classrooms for the same cohort (grade) in the same school (e.g., McEwan, 2003; Vigdor
and Nechayba, 2004, 2006; Kang, 2007; Ammermueller and Pischke, 2009).
A surprising result for our data is that the within-school estimate of the coefficient of the
average lagged peer test score is negative and significant. We argue that the unexpected neg-
ative estimate of peer coefficient is explained by correlation in measurement errors between
the individual- and the peer-level regressors. In our within-school estimation, we simultane-
ously control for lagged individual test score and the average lagged peer test score. These
two variables, however, are subject to transitory common shocks due to the continuing pres-
ence of former peers in a student's current peer group. In this chapter, we refer to transitory
common shocks as group-specific contextual, or environmental, influences that have only
transitory effects on students' observed outcomes, i.e., these influences affect the observed
test scores of all students in a group, but not their abilities. For example, if a teacher happens
to cover in the classroom some materials that for random reasons are tested in the exam, the
test scores of all students in the class will be inflated for this particular exam. The presence
of such transitory common shocks will lead to a positive correlation in measurement errors
between the individual- and the peer-level lagged test score variables. We derive formally
that such a positive correlation in measurement errors will lead to a negative bias in the
estimate of peer coefficient. In our context, this negative bias due to transitory common
shocks on lagged test scores dominates the within-school estimator, making the point esti-
mate negative and significant. The source of this bias is the presence of a student's former
peers in her current peer group. The longitudinal structure of our data allows us to track
the primary school origins of a student's peers and distinguish between new peers and old
peers. In our sample, on average three-quarters of a student's middle school peers are new
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peers. Our way to address this transitory-common-shock problem is to use the lagged test
score measures of new peers to instrument for the corresponding lagged test score measures
of all peers. Under the assumption that transitory shocks in lagged test scores are uncorre-
lated for students from different primary schools, the measurement error in the lagged test
scores of new peers is expected to be unrelated to the measurement error in lagged individual
test score. Hence, the transitory-common-shock problem can be circumvented by using the
lagged test score measures of new peers as instruments. The existence of transitory common
shocks has been well documented in the school accountability literature, in which it leads
a regression-to-the-mean problem in school or teacher assessment (e.g., Kane and Staiger,
2002; Betts and Dannenberg, 2002). The potential effect of the transitory common shocks on
lagged individual and peer test scores, however, has largely been ignored in the peer effects
literature. This chapter clarifies the econometric problem of transitory common shocks on
lagged test scores and makes an important methodological contribution to the existing peer
effects literature by proposing an IV strategy to correct this problem.
In our linear-in-means peer effects models, we examine the effect of peer gender mix
and average lagged peer test score on a student's 9th-grade math score in a school fixed-
effect framework. As discussed earlier, we instrument the average lagged peer test score
with the average lagged test score of new peers to circumvent the transitory-common-shock
problem. Unlike some previous studies that find positive spillover effects of girls on math
scores (Hoxby, 2000; Whitemore, 2003; Lavy and Schlosser, 2009), we find no evidence that
peer gender composition has an impact on students' 9th-grade math scores. Our within-
school IV estimate of the linear-in-means model also shows little evidence that having peers of
higher average lagged test score significantly improves a student's test score in math, although
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the IV coefficient is quite imprecisely estimated. This finding contrasts with some existing
studies on educational peer effects in China, which have found significant and positive effects
of average peer achievement (Ding and Lehrer, 2007; Lai, 2007; Carman and Zhang, 2008).
We believe, however, that the within-school, between-cohort variation in peer composition we
rely on for identification is more credibly exogenous than those in these previous studies.3
Some recent well-identified studies also find no evidence of a significant positive effect of
average peer achievement in the linear-in-means specifications and suggest other alternative
peer effects models (e.g., Hoxby and Weingarth, 2005; Duflo, Dupas and Kremer, 2008).
We then explore some simple nonlinear peer effects models, allowing peer influences to
operate through the dispersion of the distribution of lagged peer test scores or through the
interaction between the distribution of lagged peer test scores and a student's initial achieve-
ment. Our results on the effect of peer heterogeneity, measured by the inter-quartile range
(IQR) of lagged peer test scores, show that students benefit from having more homogeneous
peers: the point estimate indicates that a 0.2ca reduction in the IQR of 6th-grade peer test
scores, a magnitude of change over two-thirds of the middle schools in our sample had expe-
rienced among three adjacent cohorts, can increase a student's test score by 0.1a. Estimates
of heterogeneous peer effects models also show some interesting findings. First, a rightward
shift in the distribution of lagged peer test scores benefits high-achieving students relative
to low-achieving students, making the overall effect of the average lagged peer test score
3 Ding and Lehrer (2007) rely on variation in peer quality across schools for identification. Even though
they include observed school and teacher characteristics as control variables, the observed peer quality might
still be endogenous to the unobserved school and teacher characteristics, resulting in omitted-variable biases
in their estimates. Lai (2007) and Carman and Zhang (2008) both exploit variation in peer quality across
classrooms within the same school-grade (cohort). They both argue that students are randomly assigned
into classrooms within schools. However, even if the assignment rule is indeed random, imperfect compliance
with initial classroom assignment would still lead to upward biases in their estimates. Zhang (2009) shows
that a substantial proportion of students opt out of their assigned middle school in China.
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insignificant. Second, a mean-preserving contraction in the distribution of lagged peer test
scores benefits all students, but to a greater extent for those in the middle of a school's
lagged test score distribution. Both of these findings are in favor of ability tracking for math
learning.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2.2 provides background and
describes the data; Section 2.3 discusses the econometric problem and presents the empirical
strategy; Section 2.4 presents the empirical results on peer effects on student test scores; and
Section 2.5 provides some concluding remarks.
2.2 Background and Data
2.2.1 Institutional Background and Data Construction
The cornerstone of this research is the analysis of peer effects on student achievement in
middle school. The data come from administrative records of a school district in Wuhan.
Based on the district's administrative records, we construct a matched panel data set that
tracks three successive cohorts of middle school students in the district who had completed
middle school between 2005 and 2007. The middle school system of the district includes
13 public neighborhood schools and two semi-private magnet schools. Upon graduation
from primary school, each student is assigned to one of the 13 neighborhood middle schools
based on their residency. The zoning scheme for middle school, however, is not fixed over
time. The school district creates a new zoning scheme every year and announces it in June
after 6th-grade students complete their primary school. As proximity has been taken into
consideration in creating the zoning scheme, students know in advance the set of nearby
neighborhood middle schools they might be assigned to, but do not know the exact school
until the announcement by the school district. Since primary school enrollment is also based
on residency, a student usually has some of her former schoolmates from primary school
assigned to the same neighborhood middle school with her. Students also have the option to
apply to one of the two semi-private magnet schools in the district and will be selected based
on an admission lottery (Zhang, 2009). 4 On average, about 30 percent of the students in the
district opt out from their assigned neighborhood middle school to a semi-private magnet
school.
Our panel data set is constructed by matching administrative student records from two
sources. Student information at the end of middle school comes from the city's High School
Entrance Exam (HSEE) database, which includes each student's middle school of graduation
and test scores in four subjects examined in the citywide uniform HSEE: math, science,
Chinese, and English. Student information before the start of middle school comes from
the district's records of students' primary school of graduation and their math scores in a
district-wide uniform exam taken at the end of 6th grade.5
Some limitations remain in the structure of the matched panel data set. First, the two
databases do not share perfect individual identification information to guarantee unique
tracking of the academic histories of all students. Specifically, we can only use the combi-
nation of name and gender to match student records in the two databases. Some students
4Neighborhood middle schools are tuition-free under the compulsory education law, but magnet schools
charge additional tuition. Zhang (2009) provides details about the magnet school admission process.
5Students also take an exam in Chinese at the end of 6th grade. The Chinese exam includes a writing
section. Students' Chinese test scores are largely non-comparable across schools as grading standards differ
substantially across schools.
cannot be uniquely tracked due to multiple matches to common names. In addition, some
students in the HSEE database have no matched primary school records, either because they
attended a primary school outside the district or because their names were misspelled in one
or both databases. 6 Second, we can only identify peer composition at the cohort (grade) level
but not the classroom level. The classroom-level measures of peer composition may be more
desirable if peer externalities take place mainly through classroom interactions. However,
classroom-level measures are likely to be endogenous as school administrators and parents
can have some discretion in placing students in different classes within a grade. Because of
the potential sorting of students across classrooms within a grade, we would still use the
cohort-level measures even if classroom-level measures were available.
Our sample consists of 7,435 students from three successive cohorts in the district whose
academic histories are uniquely tracked. Students in our sample account for about 86 percent
of the universe of 8,620 students who had completed middle school in the district during 2005-
2007. Our data are ideal for analyzing peer effects in education for two reasons. First, we
measure individual and peer abilities by lagged test scores, which are much more precise
proxies than other individual and peer characteristics such as mother's education (McEwan,
2003) and number of books at home (Ammermueller and Pischke, 2009). Second, there is
a large amount of reshuffling of peers during the transition from primary school to middle
school and the longitudinal structure of the data allows us to distinguish between new peers
and old peers. As we will discuss in further detail in Section 2.3.3, separating new peers
from old peers is very important for the identification of peer effects when lagged test scores
6Misspelling is more likely to occur in the primary school information records as we have obtained these
records in handwritten paper documents and coded them into an electronic database. The HSEE records
are obtained in electronic format.
are used. For concerns about the sensitivity of our results to the inclusion of two magnet
schools, we replicate all our analyses to a subsample of 5,191 students from neighborhood
middle schools only. Results of this subsample remain qualitatively the same as the full
sample. We therefore report only the results of the full sample in this chapter.
2.2.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2-1 presents descriptive statistics for the matched sample. Panel A shows statistics
for three individual-level variables: gender, 6th-grade math score, and 9th-grade math score.
Panel B reports four exogenous measures of peer composition in middle school: proportion of
female peers, proportion of new peers, average 6th-grade peer math score, and inter-quartile
range (IQR) of 6th-grade peer math scores. For the latter two measures of lagged test scores,
Panel B also reports separate statistics for new peers only. Column 1 shows the means for
these variables. The sample is balanced in gender, consisting of roughly 50 percent girls.
On average, three-quarters of a student's peers in middle school are new peers from other
primary schools. For ease of interpretation, we normalize student test scores by cohorts to
have zero means and standard deviations of one. As some students are not included in our
matched sample for reasons discussed above, any observed deviation of our sample mean
test score from zero reflects selection into the matched sample. For instance, the average
6th-grade test score (0.035a) in our sample is slightly higher than the district average (which
is normalized to be zero). Our explanation of this difference is that a disproportionate share
of students from high mobility families (e.g., rural migrants), who on average have lower
academic achievement, opt out of the district's middle school system and are therefore not
tracked in our matched sample. The IQR of lagged peer test scores in our sample is 1.04a.
For reference, the IQR of a standard normal distribution is 1.35a, which is what we would
expect to see had students been randomly assigned to middle schools. The observation of a
smaller IQR of lagged peer test scores than the case of random assignment indicates student
sorting in peer group formation.
Column 2 reports the standard deviations of these individual- and peer-level variables.
As any between-school variation is removed in the school fixed-effect framework, our source
for identification is variation across cohorts within the same school. Hence, column 3 reports
a measure of the within-school dispersion of the individual- and the peer-level variables: the
standard deviation of the residual of each variable after removing school and cohort fixed
effects. Figures 2-1 to 2-3 plot the within-school variation in peer composition measured by
gender mix, average 6th-grade test scores, and IQR of 6th-grade math scores, respectively.
These figures show that there is a fair amount of cohort-to-cohort variation in peer composi-
tion within schools. For example, over the three consecutive cohorts observed in the sample,
11 out of a total of 15 schools have experienced a more than seven-percentage-point change
in the proportion of female peers, 10 schools have experienced a more than 0.30a change in
the average 6th-grade math scores, and 11 schools have experienced a 0.20a change in the
IQR of 6th-grade math scores.
2.3 Empirical Strategy
2.3.1 The Model Framework
We start from a simple linear-in-means education production function of the following form:
YYic = Aics + AA(-i)c8 + ,8 + cs + vic8  (2.1)
where Yi, is a student outcome, such as a test score, for student i of cohort c in school
s; Aic, is the exogenous predetermined ability of student i; A(-i)c is the average ability of
student i's peers; 0, represents the school-specific common-shock effects, arising from school-
level unobserved common contextual, or environmental, influences that affect the outcomes
of all students in that school; c, represents variation in the common-shock effects across
cohorts within schools and has a zero-mean within each school; and vic is an individual-level
stochastic error term that has a zero-mean within each cohort in each school. Note that the
model is set up by assuming no cohort-to-cohort evolution in student ability Ai, or outcome
YiE . In practice, such cohort-to-cohort evolution can be easily controlled by including a
cohort fixed effect.
The identification of peer effects A in equation (2.1) faces two major challenges. First, Aics
and A(-i)c are latent variables and cannot be observed directly. Second, the two common-
shock effects 0, and c,, reflect correlated effects and will give rise to a bias in the estimated
peer coefficient A if they are correlated with A(-i)c,. Let us pretend for a moment that we have
perfect measures of Ac, and A(_i), and focus on the second challenge of isolating peer effects
from correlated effects. Random assignment of students to groups, where a group refers to a
cohort in a school in our context, can solve this problem because randomization breaks the
potential link between peer composition (A(_i)c) and the common shock effects (0, and as).
However, true random assignment rarely exists outside experimental settings (Sacerdote,
2001; Zimmerman, 2003; Duflo et al., 2007, 2008). In practice, parents choose a school
based on its quality and the composition of its peers, and schools also have some discretion in
choosing students for admission. Hence, peer quality A(-i)c, will be systematically correlated
with common shock effects ,. at the school level, causing the OLS estimator of A to be
biased. A possible way to account for such school-level correlated effects is to use within-
school estimation that exploits variation in peer composition across adjacent cohorts within
the same school.
As shown in Appendix A, the within-school specification of the education function can
be written as
Yics = 1aics + Ai(-i)cs + Acs + vic (2.2)
where yics, ai8, and -(-i)c, are derivations from their school means. The basic idea behind
the within-school estimation is to examine whether, for students from adjacent cohorts in
the same school, those who have more favorable peers (in terms of average peer ability)
in their cohort score higher conditional on their own abilities. The identification assump-
tion of the within-school estimation is that the within-school, between-cohort variation in
peer composition a(-i)cs is uncorrelated with the within-school, between-cohort variation in
common-shock effects nac. Under this identification assumption, the cohort-to-cohort varia-
tion in common-shock effects rc, can be subsumed into a general error term cic, such that
Eac = ACS + vics. Consequently, the within-school model estimates the following equation:
Yics = 3aics + AX(-i)cs + Eic8  (2.3)
where cov(ai, Eics) = cov(-(_i)cs, Eics) = 0.
Although equation (2.3) is not confounded by correlated effects given the above assump-
tion, it still cannot be estimated directly because the de-meaned ability measures ai and
6(-i)c, are not directly observed. Lagged test scores are often used as proxies for latent
abilities. Let xic, denote the deviation of the observed lagged individual test score from its
school mean, and wic, denote the deviation of the observed average lagged peer test score
from its school mean. Appendix A shows that xic, and wic, are related to ai and a(-i)g as
follows:
xi, = acs + vics (2.4a)
wics = -(-i)cs + Uic (2.4b)
where vic is a stochastic error term that has a zero mean within each school and is uncor-
related with eic,, and ui, = (-i)c,. Substituting equations (2.4a) and (2.4b) into equation
(2.3) yields
Yics = Oxics + Awics + ic (2.5)
where ics = ics - vics - Aui,. Note that xtrs (wics) and ic are correlated because they
both contain vic, (uics).
Ammermueller and Pischke (2009) consider a similar within-school estimation of peer
effects in the presence of measurement errors. While we rely on variation across cohorts
within the same schools for identification, they use comparisons across classes within the same
grade in the same school. As they do not have students' lagged test scores, they use parents'
reports of number of books at home as a measure of peer composition. They argue that classes
are formed roughly randomly in European primary schools and the measurement errors in
books at homes are uncorrelated within classes. In our context, these assumptions would
imply that the within-school, between-cohort variation in peer quality a(-i), is idiosyncratic
and not related to ai, or fics, and that the error terms vic, and uic are uncorrelated. Under
these assumptions, the within-school estimators Ow and Aw converge to:
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where oa, a2, a , and a2 denote the variances of aic, vice, d(-i), and ui,. Although xi,, and
wir, are both correlated with the error term V4, in equation (2.5), they are uncorrelated with
each other under the above assumptions. Hence, Ow and Aw are both subject to attenuation
biases in the classical errors-in-variables (EIV) problem. Specifically, the plims of 3W and
Aw are regression coefficients in the following model:
Yics = xics + Aics + ics (2.7)
where = a , 00 = 0 A, and s = (0 - 3)xis + (A - A)wis + (Eics - Ovics - Auics).
a V a + ,,
Because of the unobservable nature of individual and peer abilities, the structural coefficients
/ and A in the ability model equation (2.1) cannot be estimated directly. The regression
coefficients 3 and A in equation (2.7), however, are estimable and can be interpreted as
important policy parameters of interest: the marginal effect of an individual's lagged test
score and the marginal effect of the average lagged peer test score.
Ammermueller and Pischke (2009) argue that, if there exists another set of independent
measures of the same individual and peer variables xz and wa, (e.g., students' reports of
number of books at home in addition to parents' reports), using xe and w', as instruments
for xics and wi, can correct the measurement error problem and provide consistent estimates
of 0 and A. However, we do not always have two measurements of the same variables, and,
even if we do, the errors in the two measurements may well be correlated. Hence, their IV
approach to correct the measurement error problem may not always be feasible. Despite the
classical attenuation biases, the within-school estimators f3 and Aw are still informative for
at least two reasons. First, they provide consistent estimators of policy parameters / and
A as defined in the previous paragraph. Second, the attenuation biases decrease with the
precision of the proxy ability measures. We expect students' lagged test scores used in our
study are more precise measures of abilities than other indirect measures, such as mother's
schooling and number of books at home, used in some previous studies.
2.3.2 The Problem of Transitory Common Shocks on Lagged Test
Scores
Table 2-2 reports the OLS and the within-school estimations that regress students' 9th-grade
math scores on their 6th-grade math scores and the average 6th-grade math scores of their
peers. Each column corresponds to a separate regression and the standard errors reported in
parentheses are adjusted for clustering within each cohort in each school. Column 1 reports
the least square estimation that does not control for school fixed effects. The OLS estimator
AOLS (0.591 with a standard error of 0.104) shows a very strong positive relationship between
one's 9th-grade test score and the average 6th-grade test score of one's peers in a cross-
sectional setting. The large positive OLS estimator of peer coefficient, however, almost
certainly confounds peer effects with "correlated effects" because of student sorting across
schools based on the unobserved school characteristics. The fact that the estimated peer
coefficient AOLS (0.591) is even larger than the estimated coefficient of own lagged test
scores /OLS (0.442) also implies that )OLS is biased upward due to correlated effects and
that the magnitude of the bias may be quite large. As we have discussed earlier, introducing
school fixed effects to the model can mitigate the bias due to school-level correlated effects.
Column 2 reports the results of the within-school estimation that includes both school and
cohort fixed effects. The F-test of the joint significance of the school fixed effects has a
p-value below 0.001, showing evidence of the existence of school-level correlated effects. Not
surprisingly, Aw is reduced considerably in the within-school estimation. What is perhaps
surprising is that Aw is now negative and significant (with a point estimate of -0.250 and a
standard error of 0.112). Although the empirical literature has not reached a consensus on
the existence and the magnitude of peer effects, the true peer coefficient A is unlikely to be
negative. Hence, we take the negative and significant point estimate of A as evidence that
our within-school estimator Aw is subject to a negative bias that cannot be simply explained
by the attenuation bias.
Next, we revisit the assumptions used to derive the within-school estimators equation
(2.6b) to examine the potential sources of such a negative bias. First, we assume that
within-school, between-cohort variation in peer quality (-i) is unrelated to the de-meaned
individual ability ai,. This assumption implies that student sorting only occurs across
schools but not across cohorts within the same school. This is plausible in our context as
parents are unlikely to be well informed and sophisticated enough to condition their school
choice decision on the cohort-to-cohort variation in peer quality within a school. Moreover,
with classical measurement errors, within-school student sorting will introduce an upward
bias in Aw, opposite to what we have seen in the data. Specifically, if there exists within-
school student sorting by ability, i.e., 7r = cov(aics, a(-i)c,) > 0, the within-school estimator
2 2Aw will converge to A - p . The third component can(alXa2 7(7a+',.+-0-rT~-__ --- _ 
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be interpreted as a correlation bias, which arises from correlation between aic, and -(-i)cs,
and has the same sign as own ability effect 0. Our second assumption is that, within the same
school, the cohort-to-cohort variation in peer quality (_-i)c, is uncorrelated with the cohort-
to-cohort variation in common-shock effects ic,. A downward bias in Aw would arise ifu(_)c
is instead negatively correlated with ,. This would be the case if, when a cohort quality
is relatively poor in a school, a principal who cares about within-school equity assigns high-
quality teachers to that cohort to partly compensate for the poor student quality. However,
the extent of such endogenous teacher assignment, if it exists at all, is likely to be quite
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limited as teachers usually rotate their grade assignment on a three-year basis (grades 7 to
9). Moreover, we would not expect a principal to manipulate teacher assignment to the
extreme extent to more than fully compensate the difference in peer quality such that the
net effect (A(_i)cs + K~.) is negatively correlated with peer quality i(-i)cs.
The third assumption to derive equation (2.6b) is that measurement errors in the individual-
and the peer-level lagged test scores are uncorrelated, i.e., p = cov(vice, uiCs) = 0, a condition
that would hold if the error terms of lagged individual test scores are i.i.d. within each
cohort in each school. However, students usually take some former peers with them when
moving to the next schooling phase. In our sample, about a quarter of a student's peers in
middle school are her former peers from the same primary school. To the extent that the
lagged test scores of students from the same primary school are subject to transitory common
shocks, the presence of a student's former peers in her current peer group leads to a positive
correlation between vic, and uic, i.e., p > 0. In this chapter, we refer to transitory common
shocks as group-specific contextual, or environmental, influences that have only transitory
effects on students' observed outcomes, i.e., these influences affect the observed test scores
of all students in a group, but not their permanent abilities.' As we have mentioned ear-
lier, random overlapping between testing contents and teachers' instructions is one source
of such transitory common shocks. Another source of such transitory common shocks is the
across-school difference in grading standards, causing students' grades to be inflated in some
schools but deflated in others. Note that random assignment of teachers to grading at the
7The literature usually uses the terminology "common shocks" to refer to common contextual factors, such
as school resources and teacher quality, that affect students' test scores through their effects on students'
abilities. However, the transitory common shocks we consider here have no (permanent) influences on
students' abilities, but only transitory effects on test scores through their effects on the measurement errors.
school or class level cannot alleviate the second type of transitory common shocks, although
random assignment of grading at the individual level will work. Moreover, there is no direct
way to correct the first type of transitory common shocks.
When the imperfect individual and peer ability measures xic8 and wi, are subject to
transitory common shocks, the correlation between the error terms vic, and usi, will carry over
to xzc and wic. Hence, the standard attenuation formulation no longer applies. Appendix
A shows that, in the presence of transitory common shocks in lagged test scores, the within-
school estimator of peer coefficient Aw converges as follows:
2 2 2
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Assuming that / and A are both positive, the within-school estimator Aw underestimates
A as both bias components in equation (2.8) are negative (see proof in Appendix A). The
first bias component, which we refer to as the "attenuation bias," is similar to the classical
attenuation bias formula except that it has an additional adjustment component (-2)
in both the numerator and denominator to correct for the correlation between the vi, and
uic. Note that when p > 0, this attenuation bias is smaller in magnitude than the classical
attenuation bias (- 2 A). The second component, which we refer to as the "transitory-
common-shock bias," arises because the peer-level regressor wic., is negatively correlated with
pics (= eic - Ovic, - Auic,) through its correlations with both vic, and ui,, in the presence of
transitory common shocks. Specifically, cov (wiC2 , ic) = -a2 when measurement errors vic
and ui,, are independent, while cov (wics, ,,,) = -Op - Aa when vi,, and ui,, are correlated.
The second bias component in equation (2.8) can dominate the true coefficient A and reverse
the sign of Aw when 0 is sufficiently large compared to A. Hence, our explanation of the
negative and significant within-school estimator Aw is that the lagged individual and peer
test scores used in our estimation are subject to transitory common shocks because of the
presence of former peers in one's current peer group.
2.3.3 The IV Approach
Our foremost concern about the within-school estimator Aw is that it is subject to a
transitory-common-shock bias. The empirical evidence indicates that the transitory-common-
shock bias dominates the within-school estimator Aw and reverses its sign. The source of
this bias is the correlation between vic, and ui,, arising from the presence in a student's
current peer group of her former peers, whose lagged test scores are subject to transi-
tory common shocks just like her own lagged test score. An idea for overcoming the
transitory-common-shock bias is to use the average lagged test scores of a student's new
peers (wic8,new = X(-i)cs,new) as an instrument for the average lagged test score of all peers
(wics), so as to consistently estimate an intermediate model similar to equation (2.7). The
error term uics,new in the peer-level regressor wic,new is expected to be uncorrelated with the
error term vic, in the individual-level regressor xzi, under the assumption that transitory
shocks in lagged test scores are uncorrelated for students from different primary schools.
However, there remains the question of what is the formulation of the peer coefficient A* we
actually estimate in this IV approach and to what extent A* is informative regarding the
true structural coefficient A. This is shown in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 Let yics denote an outcome of interest for student i of cohort c in school s;
let xic, denote the lagged test score of student i, which is an imperfect measure of student i's
latent ability aic8 such that xics = aicss + vics, where vi,, is a stochastic individual error term;
let wic, denote the average lagged test score of student i's peers such that wics = (-i)cs
a(-i)c + Ujic, where uic8 = (-i)cs; and let wics,new denote the average lagged test score of
student i's new peers such that wics,new = "(-i)cs,new = -d(-i)cs,new + Uics,new. Suppose the
latent education production function takes the following linear-in-means form:
Yics aics + (-i)cs + Eics
Assume all the covariances between ai, vi,, a(-i)cs, ui,, a(-i)cs,new, uics,new, and Ef, 8 are
zero except for cov(vic,, ui,), which is denoted as p and is assumed to be positive. Then,
using wics,new as an instrument for wic, can provide consistent IV estimators of the following
intermediate model:
ics = *xics + A*ics + Wics (2.9)
where 1* = -0, A A a +2-A and Wics = (8 - *)xcs + ( -
anew lnew anew unew
A*)wics + (fics - fvics - Auic). In the preceding formulas, a, a2, o , and a2 denote,
respectively, the variances of aics , i, (-i)cs,new, and uics,new
The proof of Proposition 1 is provided in Appendix B. As lagged test scores are imperfect
measures of abilities, attenuation biases remain in both 3w,,y and Aw,1v. However, using
wic,ne, as an instrument for wic, removes the transitory-common-shock bias in Aw, v because
the error term Uis,ne, in the instrument wic,new is uncorrelated with the error term in lagged
individual test score vics. The transitory-common-shock bias component remains in Ow,iv as
we do not have an instrument for individual lagged test scores. Despite the attenuation bias,
Aw,1v is still informative because it is a consistent estimator of an interesting intermediate
parameter (- i ) A), which converges to the policy parameter of interest A(= Z A)
anew unew a
if the information-to-noise ratio in the lagged test scores of new peers ( ~~) is the same as
that in the lagged test scores of all peers (,).
2.4 Empirical Results
2.4.1 First-stage Results
Results in Table 2-2 show a possibly serious negative transitory-common-shock bias in the
within-school estimator of peer coefficient Aw. Our approach to correct this transitory-
common-shock problem is to use the lagged test score measures of new peers to instrument
for the corresponding measures of all peers. Specifically, we are interested in the causal
effects of two lagged peer test score measures: the mean and the IQR. In order to overcome
the transitory-common-shock problem, we instrument the average lagged peer test score
using the average lagged test score of new peers, and instrument the IQR of lagged peer
test scores with the IQR of lagged test scores of new peers. Table 2-3 shows the first-
stage relationships. All specifications include as covariates the student's own lagged test
score, the proportion of female peers, a female dummy, middle school dummies, and cohort
dummies. Column 1 shows that the two average lagged test score measures are highly
positively correlated: a one standard deviation increase in the average lagged test score of
new peers is associated with 0.56 standard deviation increase in the average lagged peer test
score. The first-stage coefficient estimate is less than the average proportion of new peers
in our sample (75 percent), suggesting a negative association between the average lagged
test score of old peers and that of new peers.8 This observation indicates that the school
district may have some equity concern in mind when determining the middle school zoning
scheme every year. In such case, studies examining solely the reduced-form effect of new
peers (e.g., Gibbons and Telhaj, 2006; Lavy, Silva, and Weinhardt, 2009) may underestimate
the magnitude of peer effects. Column 3 estimates the first-stage relationship between two
IQR measures: a one standard deviation increase in the IQR of lagged test scores of new
peers is associated with a 0.30 standard deviation increase in the IQR of lagged test scores
of all peers. Columns 2 and 4 include both instruments and estimate the first-stage models,
respectively, for the average lagged peer test score and the IQR of lagged peer test scores.
The first-stage coefficient of the relevant instrument (i.e., the average lagged test score of
new peers in column 2 and the IQR of lagged test scores of new peers in column 4) remains
virtually unchanged after the inclusion of the other instrument.
2.4.2 Basic Results on Peer Effects
Table 2-4 summarizes our basic results on peer effects from homogenous models. Columns
1-3 present results from reduced-form regressions and columns 4-6 report the corresponding
IV results. Let us first consider the coefficients of two individual-level regressors: the female
dummy and the lagged individual test score. The coefficients of both these individual-level
regressors are consistently estimated across all the reduced-form and IV specifications. The
8Another way to examine such a negative association is to regress the lagged average test score of old
peers on that of new peers and the same set of covariantes. The estimated coefficient of the lagged average
test score of new peers in that regression is -0.166 (with a standard error of 0.022).
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coefficient of the female dummy is statistically insignificant in all specifications, indicating
no significant gender gap in 9th-grade math scores. The coefficient of lagged individual test
score is highly significant and is estimated to be virtually the same (around 0.43) across all
the six specifications. As shown in Proposition 1, fw,1 v puts a lower bound of the structural
coefficient of own ability effect f when the peer ability effect A is nonnegative.
We now turn to the results on peer effects. We are interested in three measures of peer
composition: peer gender mix, average lagged peer test score (a proxy measure for the average
peer ability), and IQR of the lagged peer test scores (a proxy measure for the spread of the
distribution of peer ability). Unlike some previous studies that find positive spillover effects
of girls on math scores (Hoxby, 2000; Whitemore, 2003; Lavy and Schlosser, 2009), we find
no evidence that peer gender composition has an impact on students' 9th-grade math scores.
The coefficient of the proportion of female peers variable is insignificant in all the reduced-
form and the IV specifications. Columns 1 reports the reduced-form effect of the average
lagged test score of new peers. Once we replace average lagged achievement of a student's
peers with the same measure of her new peers, the negative peer coefficient for the within-
school estimator (-0.250 with a standard error of 0.112) disappears. Column 4 presents the
corresponding IV estimator of the average lagged peer test score. Unfortunately, both the
reduced-form (0.121 with a standard error of 0.087) and the IV coefficients (0.218 with a
standard error of 0.175) are very imprecisely estimated. Although we cannot reject the null
hypothesis of no linear-in-means peer effects, we also cannot reject very large peer effects.
The imprecise reduced-form and IV estimators are likely to be because of the relatively
small number of clusters (cohorts x schools) in our sample. Despite the imprecise results,
the pattern of change from the within estimator to the reduced-form and IV estimators still
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shows strong evidence for the existence of a severe negative bias of using the average lagged
peer test score measure when this measure is subject to transitory common shocks just like
the student's own lagged test score.
We next examine the effect of peer group heterogeneity, measured by the IQR of lagged
peer test scores, on student achievement. Columns 2 and 5, report, respectively, the reduced-
form and the IV estimates of the effect of the IQR of lagged peer test scores. Both estimators
are negative and significant at the five percent level, suggesting that students benefit from
having homogeneous peers. The point estimate of the IV coefficient (-0.566 with a standard
error of 0.327) indicates that a 0.2a reduction in the IQR of 6th-grade peer test scores,
a magnitude of change 11 out 15 schools in our sample had experienced, can increase a
student's test score by 0.1a. Column 3 presents the results of reduced-form estimation that
includes both the mean and the IQR of lagged test scores of new peers. Column 6 shows
the corresponding IV results that control for both the mean and the IQR of lagged peer
test scores. The IV estimate of the coefficient of the IQR of lagged peer test scores (-0.571
and a standard error of 0.321) is insensitive to the inclusion of average peer test score. The
point estimate of the IV coefficient of the average lagged peer test score (-0.007 with a
standard error of 0.199), however, has been reduced substantially once we control for the
IQR of lagged peer test scores. The reduction in the point estimate is due to a negative
correlation between the residual average peer test score and the residual IQR of lagged test
scores (after controlling for school fixed effects).
2.4.3 Allowing Heterogeneity for Peer Effects
Peer influences, however, may be heterogeneous and operate through the interaction between
the distribution of peer ability and a student's own ability. For instance, some existing
computational models of peer sorting in schools assumes that peer effects exhibit single
crossing, i.e., an increase in average peer ability affects high-achieving students more than
low-achieving students (Nechyba, 2006). In addition, several recent empirical studies find
that students seem to benefit from having peers with similar characteristics as themselves,
evidence in support of tracking (e.g., Hoxby and Weingarth, 2005; Duflo et al., 2008).
We explore these alternative models of heterogeneous peer effects in this subsection by
interacting measures of lagged peer test scores - the mean and the IQR in particular - with
student's own lagged test scores. To implement the estimation of these heterogeneous peer
effects models in an IV framework, we instrument each interaction term between measures of
lagged peer test scores and a student's lagged test score with the corresponding interaction
term between measures of lagged test score of new peers and the student's lagged test score.
Tables 2-5 and 2-6 present the first-stage and reduced-form results of these heterogeneous
models. We focus our discussion in the text on the IV results reported in Table 2-7. Column
1 examines whether peer effects exhibit the single-crossing property. The IV coefficient of
the interaction term between the average lagged peer test score and a student's own lagged
test score (0.113 with a standard error of 0.052) is positive and significant at the five percent
level, evidence in support of the single-crossing property. Column 2 examines whether a
change in the dispersion of lagged peer test scores in a school affects students at the middle
of the school's lagged test score distribution differently than those at the two tails. To do so,
we interact the IQR of the distribution of lagged peer test scores with the absolute deviation
of a student's own lagged test score from the school-cohort median, and instrument this
interaction term with the corresponding interaction term using the IQR of her new peers.
The IV coefficient of this interaction is positive and significant at the one percent level (0.093
with a standard error of 0.024), indicating that students in the middle of the lagged test
score distribution benefit most from a contraction in the spread of the distribution of lagged
peer test scores. Column 3 provides estimates of the full specification that includes both
the mean and the IQR of lagged peer test scores as well as their interactions with students'
own lagged test scores. Results of column 3 can summarize our findings. First, a rightward
shift in the distribution of lagged peer scores benefits high-achieving students relative to
low-achieving students, making the overall effect of average lagged test score insignificant.
Second, a mean-preserving contraction in the distribution of lagged peer scores benefits all
students, but to a greater extent for those in the middle of a school's lagged test score
distribution. Both of these findings are in favor of ability tracking.
2.5 Conclusion
We provide empirical evidence on the existence and the structure of peer effects in middle
school using a unique longitudinal data set from China. The peer effects literatue seems
to be dominated by discussions on the relection problem and the selection issues, whereas
little attention is being paid to the potential correlation in measurement errors between
the individual- and the peer-level regressors, which we find important in our data. Such a
correlation in measurement errors would arise if we simultaneously control for the lagged
individual and peer test scores as the two measures are subject to transitory common shocks
due to the continuing presence of former peers in a student's current peer group. An impor-
tant contribution of this chapter is to clarify the impact of lagged transitory common shocks
on estimates of peer effects. We derive formally that a positive correlation in measurement
errors between the individual- and the peer-level regressors will lead to a negative bias in
the estimate of peer coefficient, and provide empirical evidence that the transitory-common-
shock problem is more than theoretical. We propose an empirical strategy to circumvent
the transitory-common-shock problem by using the lagged test score measures of new peers,
whose measurement error is uncorrelated with the measurement error in lagged individual
test score, to instrument for the corresponding lagged test score measures of all peers.
Our main identification strategy uses within-school variation in peer composition across
adjacent cohorts to control for student sorting across schools and the unobserved school
characteristics that affect student outcomes. Our within-school IV estimate of the linear-
in-means model shows little evidence that having peers of higher average lagged test score
significantly improves a student's test score in math. The coefficients of the average lagged
peer test scores, however, are not very precisely estimated. While we cannot reject the null
hypothesis of no peer effects, we also cannot reject relatively large peer effects that have
been found in the previous literature. Estimates of heterogeneous peer effects models show
some evidence in favor of ability tracking for math learning. We find that a rightward shift
in the distribution of lagged peer test scores benefits high-achieving students relative to low-
achieving students, while a mean-preserving contraction in the distribution of lagged peer
test scores benefits all students, but to a greater extent for those in the middle of a school's
lagged test score distribution.
2.6 Appendices
2.6.1 Appendix A The Within-School Estimation
We are interested in the within-school estimation of equation (2.1) in the text
Yics= fAics + AA(-)cs + 0, + Nc + vic, (Al)
Taking average of equation (Al) for all students in school s yields
Ys = p3As + AA + 0, (A2)
1h1where Y, = - Y~ , = E A i , A = -_ - 1Ais, and n, and nc, represent, respec-
2 i
tively, the total number of students in school s and the total number of students in cohort c
in school s. Here A: differs from A, because we use leave-out average peer ability in equa-
tion (Al). Note that ,, and vi, are not included in equation (A2) as they both have zero
means at the school level. We can transform Y,,c, Ai, and A(_)c, into derivations from their
school means such that yis = E, - Y,, aics = Aia - A,, and -(-i)c = A(-i) - A*. Sub
stracting equation (A2) from equation (Al), the within-school specification of the education
production function is
Yics = Oaics + A(-i)cs + ni, + vis (A3)
Consider the following model generating the lagged test score (Xics):
Xics = As 8 + Vics
where Vic, is a stochastic individual error term that is uncorrelated with Ai,, and Eics. Let
Wic denote the average lagged test score of student i's peers such that:
Wic = X(-i)cs = A(-i)cs + Uics
where Ui,8 = V(_i) 8 . The within-school transformation of Xi,8 and Wic, can be written as
follows
xics = Xics - XY = (Acs - A) + (Vics - Vs) = ai + vic, (A4a)
ics = Wcs - W = (A(-i)c - A-) + (Ucs - Us) = a(-i)cs + uics (A4b)
Note that the above within-school transformation allows the possibility that V, and Us are
nonzero. For example, if a middle school always draw students from a primary school that
manipulate the test scores of its students by lowering the grading standards, V, and Us
would both be positive. Such across-school variation in measurement errors, however, is
accounted for in the within-school estimation. Substituting equations (A4a) and (A4b) into
equation (A3) yields
Yics = fxics + Awics + Pic (A5)
where ?/ics = ics - Uics - Auic. We assume all covariances between aics, vics, (-i)cs, uics, and
fics are zero except for cov(v 8,,, uics), which is denoted as p and is assumed to be nonnegative.
Let n denotes the total number of students in the sample, the plims of the variance and
covariance terms are
plim E (x - Y)2
n
plim (w -) 2
n
p limE ( - )(x - Y)
n
n
plim E (w - ) )(Y -
n
S2 2
= a 
+ 2
2 2
N- Or.J-5 u
= Ao
The within-school estimator ,w is
(A6)E(W -@U7)(X -) Y -(z - ) E( - )(y -
E(X - V) E(W - T), - (E(W - T)(x - y))'
Taking the plim of (A6) and substituting the above plims of the variance and covariance
terms yield,
plim/3w (o + au'V)rae - pAU2 + 02(U +V)(U + ) - p2
a24
-
2 (2
O (a 2 -
(Or + O ) -a V) (a+a)
a V _
(U2 + or2) (o2 + O2) -
(A7)
By the same argument,
E(x - V) E(W - T)(Y - V) - E(W - X)(z - T) E(x - Y)(y - )
plim (x - )2 (w - W) 2 _ (Z-(w - W)(x - ))2
(o_ +02 )Au,2 - poo
(2a+ O2)(a~ + ) - p2
2 p2
(A-- ( '2) A-
12 +2 p( + ) - c c~U) (Oa+0,2)
- a r (a2 + o,) + ) - 2
7T 
---
a o c)
As p2 = [cov(v, U)12 < var(v)var(u) = aa2 2, the last two terms
negative when p > 0. For the special case in which p = 0,
p lim Ow
p lim Aw
(A8)
in (A7) and (A8) are
2
2a
A- " A(UU+ U)
2.6.2 Appendix B Proof of Proposition 1
We are interested in using wics,ne, as an instrument for wic8 to estimate the following inter-
mediate model of interest:
Yics = /*xics + A*wics + Oics (A9)
where s = (/ - 3*)xics + (A - A*)wics + (Eics - ics - Aucs). For wis,ne, to be a valid
instrument for wi,, the formulations of /* and A* need to satisfy the following two condi-
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plim Aw
cov(xics, 7ics)
cOv(wics,new, q3cs)
= 0
= 0
(1A)
(1B)
Condition (lA) implies
cov(x., q)
= ( - *)var(xics) + (A - A*)Cov(xics, wics) - 3cov(xics, Vc ) - Acov(x Zi, uics)
= (2o - 2*)( + ) + (A - *)pf- 02 - O
= - *(cr + u) - *p
= 0 (lA')
Condition (1B) implies
tions:
COV(Wics,new, ics)
= (i- *)COWics,new, xics) + (A - A*)COV(Wics,new, wics) - COV (Wics,new, vics) - Acov(wig,new, ics)
( 1 - 0*)0 + (A A*)(1 - p)(n + a,) - 00 - A(1 - p)auew
(1 -p)[Aui2 - A*( , , + a,)]anew 07new Unew
= 0
The formulations of 0* and A* that satisfies both (lA') and (1B') are:
(1B')
2
a + v
a* anew
ac
-  + a
2
anew Ulnew
p a2P anew
2 + ane +al-  a 2
a new Utnew
Therfore, using wics,ne, as an instrument for wics provides consistent IV estimates of P*
and A* as defined above.
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Table 2-1 Descriptive Statistics
Mean s.d. within-school s.d.
Panel A: Individual characteristics:
Female 0.497 0.500 0.500
6th-grade math score 0.035 0.927 0.865
9th-grade math score -0.005 1.002 0.914
Panel B: Peer-group characteristics
All peers:
Proportion of female peers 0.497 0.036 0.029
Proportion of new peers 0.749 0.281 0.151
Average 6th-grade peer math score 0.035 0.363 0.140
Inter-quartile range of 6th-grade peer math scores 1.043 0.233 0.118
New peers:
Average 6th-grade math score 0.010 0.383 0.183
Inter-quartile range of math scores 1.065 0.292 0.210
Number of observations 7,435
Table 2-2 OLS and Within-School Estimation
Dependent
OLS
(1)
variable: 9th-grade math score
Within
(2)
0.442*** 0.436***Own lagged test score (0.019) (0.019)
0.591*** -0.250***Average lagged peer test score (0.104) (0.112)
Middle school fixed effects no yes
Number of observations 7,435
Notes: All specifications control for a female dummy, the proportion of female peers, and cohort fixed effects. Robust
standard errors, adjusted for within-school-cohort clustering, are reported in parentheses. A triple asterisk (***) denotes
significant at the 1 percent level.
Table 2-3 The First-Stage Effects
Average lagged test score
of new peers
IQR of lagged test scores
of new peers
Dependent Variables
Average lagged peer test score IQR of lagged peer test scores
(1) (2) (3) (4)
0.555*** 0.546*** -0.058
(0.071) (0.068) (0.078)
-0.015 0.297*** 0.271***
(0.042) (0.060) (0.058)
Notes: All specifications control for own lagged test score, a female dummy, the proportion of female peers, middle school
fixed effects and cohort fixed effects. Robust standard errors, adjusted for within-school-cohort clustering, are reported in
parentheses. A triple asterisk (***) denotes significant at the 1 percent level.
Table 2-4 Basic Results of Within-school IV Estimates of Peer Effects
Female
Proportion of female peers
Own lagged test score
Average lagged peer test score
Average lagged test score of new peers
IQR of lagged peer test scores
IQR of lagged test scores of new peers
(1)
-0.020
(0.023)
-0.182
(0.614)
0.433***
(0.019)
Reduced-form
(2)
-0.020
(0.022)
0.330
(0.592)
0.432***
(0.019)
0.121
(0.087)
(3)
-0.020
(0.023)
0.313
(0.587)
0.432***
(0.019)
0.030
(0.087)
-0.168** -0.155*
(0.080) (0.077)
Notes: All specifications control for middle school fixed effects and cohort fixed effects. Robust standard errors, adjusted for within-school-cohort
arentheses. A triple asterisk (***) denotes significant at the 1 percent level. A single asterisk (*) denotes significant at the 10 percent level.
clustering, are reported
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(4)
-0.019
(0.022)
0.281
(0.696)
0.427***
(0.020)
0.218
(0.175)
(5)
-0.025
(0.024)
-0.747
(0.839)
0.426***
(0.020)
(6)
-0.025
(0.023)
-0.759
(0.869)
0.426***
(0.020)
-0..007
(0199)
-0..571*
(0.321)
-0..566*
(0.327)
Table 2-5 The First-stage Results of Heterogeneous Peer Effects Models
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
0.550*** 0.541***Average lagged test score of new peers 0.072) (0.067)(0.072) (0.067)
Average lagged test score of new peers 0.821*** 0.821***
* lagged individual test score (0.083) (0.083)
0.291*** 0.265***
IQR of lagged test scores of new peers 0.060) (0.056)(0.060) (0.056)
IQR of lagged test scores of new peers * Deviation of 0.955*** 0.953***
own lagged test score from the school-cohort median (0.032) (0.031)
Notes: Each cell of the table reports the coefficient of regressing the corresponding instrumented variable on the instrument.
All specifications control for the set of other instruments used in the model, own lagged test score, a female dummy, the
proportion of female peers, middle school fixed effects, and cohort fixed effects. Robust standard errors, adjusted for within-
school-cohort clustering, are reported in parentheses. A triple asterisk (***) denotes significant at the 1 percent level.
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Table 2-6 The Reduced-form Results of Heterogeneous Peer Effects Models
Dependent variable: 9th-grade math scores
(1) (2) (3)
0.140 0.052
Average lagged test score of new peers(0.090)
Average lagged test score of new peers 0.087** 0.091*
* Own lagged test score (0.041) (0.042)
-0.221" -0.206***
IQR of lagged test scores of new peers (0.080) (0.056)(0.080) (0.056)
IQR of lagged test scores of new peers * Deviation 0.084*** 0.086***
of own lagged test score from the school-cohort median (0.023) (0.022)
Notes: All specifications control for own lagged test score, a female dummy, the proportion of female peers, middle school
fixed effects, and cohort fixed effects. Robust standard errors, adjusted for within-school-cohort clustering, are reported in
parentheses. A triple asterisk (***) denotes significant at the 1 percent level. A double asterisk (**) denotes significant at the
5 percent level. A single asterisk (*) denotes significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 2-7 Results of Within-school IV Estimates of Heterogeneous Peer Effects
Dependent variable: 9th-grade math scores
(1) (2) (3)
0.246 0.027
Average lagged peer test score 0.180) (0.208)
(0.180) (0.208)
Average lagged peer test score 0.113** 0.097*
* Own lagged test score (0.052) (0.057)
-0.613" -0.585*
IQR of lagged peer test scores (0.327) (0.330)(0.327) (0.330)
IQR of lagged peer test scores * Deviation of own 0.093*** 0.094***
lagged test score from the school-cohort median (0.024) (0.024)
Notes: All specifications control for own lagged test score, a female dummy, the proportion of female peers, middle school
fixed effects, and cohort fixed effects. Robust standard errors, adjusted for within-school-cohort clustering, are reported in
parentheses. A triple asterisk (***) denotes significant at the 1 percent level. A double asterisk (**) denotes significant at the
5 percent level. A single asterisk (*) denotes significant at the 10 percent level.
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Figure 2-1 Within-school Variation in Peer Gender Mix
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Figure 2-2 Within-school Variation in the Average 6th-Grade Peer Test Score
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Figure 2-3 Within-school Variation in the Inter-Quartile Range of 6th-Grade Peer Test Scores
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Chapter 3
Nonparametric Bounds on Treatment
Effects with Missing and Mismatched
Outcome Data
3.1 Introduction
This chapter concerns the nonparametric analysis of randomized experiments with obser-
vational problems that prevent researchers from collecting complete and error-free outcome
data. Evaluation of a randomized experiment requires tracking the post-treatment outcomes
of the program participants. When outcome data come from a separate source (e.g., an ad-
ministrative file), it usually requires linking the program records to records in the outcome
database. The problem of missing outcomes arises if there is incomplete overlapping of com-
mon units between the program database and the outcome database (see Ridder and Moffitt
(2007) for a survey). In addition, often common variables besides the identifier are used to
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match records, e.g., we match records by name, gender, and age. Even if all program par-
ticipants are observed in the outcome database, matching based on common variables that
do not constitute a unique identifier in the outcome database may lead to imperfect match-
ing, i.e., some program participants are matched to more than one record in the outcome
database, leading to data contamination in the matched sample.
The existing literature on this subject is concerned mainly with the former problem of
missing outcomes. The population parameters of interest are in general not identified in the
presence of missing outcomes unless one makes untestable assumptions about the distribution
of missing data (e.g., missing at random). Horowitz and Manski (2000) provide a general
framework for constructing bounds for population treatment effect parameters when outcome
and covariate data are missing nonrandomly. The idea is to construct "worst-case scenario"
bounds of the treatment effect by imputing the missing data to either the largest or the
smallest possible values of the outcome. However, their approach is applicable only if the
outcome variable has a bounded support. Lee (2002, 2009) proposes a trimming procedure
for bounding average treatment effects for a specific subpopulation whose outcomes would
be observed irrespective of treatment assignment status, under the assumption of monotone
treatment selection (MTS), i.e. treatment assignment only affects sample selection in "one
direction". By restricting interest to this subpopulation whose outcomes would always be
observed, Lee's trimming procedure no longer requires a bounded support of the outcome.
In this chapter, I extend Lee's trimming strategy to construct nonparametric bounds
on average treatment effects when sample attrition and imperfect matching both exist and
interact with each other. Section 3.2 shows that average treatment effects can still be iden-
tified if imperfect matching is the only problem. This is because data errors due to multiple
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matching are statistically independent of treatment assignment status conditional on the
common variables, under random assignment and complete observation of program partic-
ipants. Throughout this chapter, we will refer to "treatment effect" as the effect of being
assigned treatment status, or "intention-to-treat effect", to bypass the problem of imper-
fect compliance with treatment assignment (Imbens and Angrist, 1994; Angrist, Imbens,
and Rubin, 1996). Section 3.3 replicates Lee's trimming procedure, and shows that sharp
bounds on average treatment effects for a subpopulation can be connstructed if matching is
based on a unique identifier (i.e., no imperfect matching) and sample selection is monotone
to treatment assignment status.
While Sections 3.2 and 3.3 separately consider each of these two observational problems,
Section 3.4 considers the presence of both problems. The interaction between sample at-
trition and imperfect matching leads to another challenge for analyzing treatment effects:
mismatching, which arises when a program participant of interest drops out of the outcome
database but is matched to one or more erroneous records in the outcome database based on
the common variables. The difference between imperfect matching (or multiple matching)
and mismatching is that the true record of interest is included in the matched set in the
former case but not in the latter case. Since the true outcome of the program participant
is not included in the matched set, mismatching leads to corrupted data in the matched
sample. When the observability of a program participant in the outcome database depends
on treatment assignment, data errors due to mismatching are not independent of treatment
assignment status. We show that average treatment effects cannot be bounded in general in
the presence of mismatching. However, if prior knowledge or a consistent estimator of the
mismatching probability is available, we can exploit this piece of information to construct
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bounds for average treatment effects under the MTS assumption.
3.2 Identification under Imperfect Matching
Let y denote the outcome of interest, d denote the randomly assigned binary treatment status,
and z denote the common variable(s) used to match program participants in the outcome
database. Define the random variables (y1 , y0, k, d, z) such that y' denotes the potential
outcome of a participant when d = 1, yo denotes the potential outcome of a participant
when d = 0, and Yk denotes the mean outcome of the k records in the outcome database
that are incorrectly matched to the participant based on z. Throughout this chapter, we
assume that both the number of incorrect matches k and the mean outcome of these incorrect
matches yk are independent of d being conditional on z. This assumption is expected to
hold under random assignment of treatment status.
For each program participant, the realized outcome is yd = y'd+y(1 -d). In this section,
we assume the outcome database is a population register in which all program participants
are observed, i.e., no sample attrition. Let d+1 denote the mean outcome of the k + 1
records matched to a program participant based on z. +d can be linked to yd and Y by
the following equation:
1 d k
k+ yd + Yk for k > 0, d = {0, 1}
+Hence, the average population1 k+treatment effect can be identified as the difference in the
Hence, the average population treatment effect can be identified as the difference in the
108
weighted average outcomes by treatment assignment status as follows:
E[y' - y0] = (k + 1)(E[, 1] - E[k+,]) (3.1)
3.3 Trimming with Missing Outcomes
This section replicates the results from Lee's trimming procedure which allows missing out-
comes but assumes perfect matching in the outcome database based on an identifier. Let
a denote an indicator of whether the outcome is observed or not. Let a1 and ao be two
latent variables denoting whether the outcome would be observed when d = 1 and d = 0,
respectively. Note that yd is observed if ad = 1 and yd is missing if ad = 0. Furthermore, it
is assumed that assignment to d, if it affects a at all, can affect a in only "one direction."
Without loss of generality, we assume that Pr[ao = 1, al = 0] = 0. This monotonicity
assumption excludes the possibility that some individuals are induced to drop out of the
sample because of the treatment, but still allows some individuals who otherwise would drop
out of the sample to be induced to stay in the sample because of the treatment.
Lee (2002) shows that the difference between the means of the observed outcomes of the
treatment and the control groups is:
E[y1 al = 1] - E[y a0 = 1]
Pr(ao = 1) Pr(ao = O, al -= 1)
Pr( = 1)E[yllao = 1] + Pr(al = 1) E[yllao = 0, a' = 1] - E[ya = 1]
Pr(al= 1) Pr(a=1)(3.2)
(3.2)
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In general, equation (3.2) will be a biased estimator for a particular parameter of interest:
E[y1 - yo a0 = 1], the average treatment effect for the subpopulation whose outcomes will
be observed irrespective of treatment status. However, the observed data can yield lower
and upper bounds E and E such that E < E[y1|ao = 1] < E. As the matching rates for
the treatment group (Pr(a' = 1)) and the control group (Pr(ao = 1)) can be identified in
the observed data, the proportion of the selected treatment group that is induced to have
non-missing outcome because of assignment to treatment can be identified as:
Pr(ao = 0, al = 1) Pr(al = 1) - Pr(ao = 1)
Pr(a 1 = 1) Pr(a' = 1)
Therefore, the lower and upper bounds for the average outcome of the ao = 1 subpopu-
lation can be identified as:
1 _ F'(1-p) 1 r"E = y f(y1)dy1 < E[y1 ao = 1] < - yf(y)dy'= E (3.4)1 -p - 1 - p (P)
where E is constructed by excluding the top p percentile from the observed treatment group
and E is constructed by excluding the bottom p percentile.
Given equation (3.4), the lower and upper bounds for the average treatment effect of the
ao = 1 subpopulation is:
E - E[y0 a = 1] < E[y - y1a0 = 1] < E- E[ya = 1] (3.5)
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3.4 Bounding Average Treatment Effects with Missing
and Mismatched Outcomes
3.4.1 Sample Attrition is Independent of Treatment Status
In this subsection, we consider the case that sample attrition exists but is independent of
the treatment status:
Assumption 1A: Independence Assumption
Pr(ao = a1) = 1
Under Assumption 1A, we can suppress the superscript of a. Let m denote the number
of records incorrectly matched based on z and let n be the number of total matches to z.
Then, by construction, we must have n = m + a. The following statements summarize the
matching outcomes and how they are related to sample attrition and imperfect matching:
(i) Missing outcome: (a = 0, m = 0)
(ii) Mismatching: (a = 0, m > 1);
(iii) Unique and correct matching: (a = 1, m = 0);
(iv) Imperfect matching: (a = 1, m > 1).
Let pk denote the probability that a program participant has k incorrectly matched
records based on z, Pr(m = k), and let 0 k denote the subgroup-specific sample attrition rate
for participants with k incorrect matches, Pr(a = 01m = k). Define qk = Pr(n = k), the
proportion of program participants with k matched records in the outcome database such
that -O qk = 1. The composition of qk can be written as the following:
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The unmatched sample: qo = Pr(n = 0) = Pr(a = 0, m = 0) = oPo
The matched sample: qk+l = Pr(n = k + 1) = Pr(a = 1, m = k) + Pr(a = 0, m = k + 1)
= (1 - Ok)pk + k+lpk+l, Vk > 0
Following Section 3.2, the observed mean outcome of program participants with k + 1
matches can be decomposed as:
E[+,lIn = k + 1] = E[+lI(a 1, m = k) or (a = 0, m = k + 1)]
(1 - k)k 1 (1- k)p kS -1E[ya|a = 1, m = k] + k k E[Vkm = k]
qk+l k.+ I qk+1 k + 1
+ Ok+Pk+E[+Im = k + 1], V k 0, d= {0, 1} (3.7)
qk+1
In equation (3.7), the first component is the outcome of interest, the second component is
data contamination due to imperfect matching, while the third component is data corruption
due to mismatching (i.e., the presence of both sample attrition and imperfect matching).
Since both Wk and Yk+1 are independent of d, the last two terms in equation (3.7) can be
canceled out when we compare the observed difference between the mean outcomes of the
treatment and control groups with k + 1 total matches:
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E[k+lln = k + 1] - E[ry+ln = k + 1]
(1 - Ok)Pk 1
S1E[y' - yoa = 1, m = k]
qk+l k-+1
Therefore, a particular parameter of interest, the difference in the mean potential out-
comes for a subpopulation whose outcomes are observed together with k mismatches (
E[y1 - yola = 1, m = k]), can be written as:
E[y' - yoa = 1, m = k] = (1k+ (k + 1)(E[y+lIn = k + 1] - E[k+l In = k + 1]) (3.8)
(1 - Ok)Pk
Note that qk+l, k + 1, and E[+ 1Iln = k + 1] - E[yk+iIn = k + 1] are all observable. The
parameter of interest, E[y - yo Ia = 1, m = k], can be bounded if the denominator (1 - 0k)pk
k k
is bounded. Define Mk = Zpl and Qk = Zq. Qk and Mk can be linked by the following
1=0 1=0
relationship:
k k-1 k
Qk = -Q1 = -P + Okpk = PPl - (1 - Ok)Pk = Mk - (1 - Ok)Pk
1=0 1=0 1=0
i.e.,
(1 - Ok)pk = Mk - Qk
Note that Qk is observable but Mk is not. Bounding (1 - Ok)Pk requires prior knowledge
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about the mismatching probability based on z in the outcome database. Often, the structure
of the common variables z could allow us to construct such prior knowledge. For example, if
we match students' test scores by name and gender, the match is usually conducted within
each cohort. But if we match name and gender of one cohort to the outcomes of another
cohort, we can get a consistent estimator of the mismatching probability qk because all
matches from a different cohort are erroneous matches.
Assume that prior knowledge, or a consistent estimator of the bound of Mk - [Mk, Mk]
- is available, (1 - Ok)Pk can be bounded by [Mk - Qk, Mk - Qk]. Therefore, the parameter
of interest, E[yl - yoa = 1, m = k], is bounded by:
1 1
qk+±(k + 1)(E[y+lln = k + 1] - E[k+ln = k + 1])[ 1 ]
Mk Qk'Mk - Qk
I define the final parameter of interest as the difference in the mean potential outcomes of
all program participants whose outcomes are observed (possibly with imperfect matching):
E[yl - y 0la = 1].
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E[y 1 - yola = 1]
00
E Pr(a = 1, m = k)E[yl - yola = 1, m = k]
k=O
Pr(a = 1)
00
E Pr(a = 1, m = k)E[yl - yola = 1,m = k]
k=O
E Pr(a = 1, m = k)
k=O
Eqk+1(k + 1)(E[+In = k + 1]- E[ n= k + 1])
= k=O (3.9)
E(1 - Ok)Pk
k=O
Note that qk+l, k + 1, and E[Y+1 n = k + 1] - E[Ok+lIn = k + 1] can all be observed directly
from the data. With (1-Ok)Pk bounded by [E (Mk- Qk), k (Mk- Qk)], E[y'-yIoa = 1]
k==O 0 k=O
can be bounded as well.
It is important to note here that, if both the actual treatment status (instead of the treat-
ment assignment status) and the outcomes are either observed or unobserved simultaneously
from the same data source, the Wald estimate of the local average treatment effect (LATE)
would be unbiased because both the first-stage and the reduced-form effects are subject to
the same degree of bias. Letting s denotes the actual treatment status, the Wald estimator
of LATE is identified as the following:
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E[yl - yo a = 1]E[y1 - yOIS = 0, S1 = 1, a = 1] == 1
E[S - SIa = 1]
-qk+1(k + 1)(E[y±in = k + 1] - E[k+lIn = k + 1])
k= (3.10)
Eqk+1(k + 1)(E[s+lIn = k +1] - E[s+l = k + 1])
k=O
3.4.2 Monotone Sample Attrition by Treatment Status
In this subsection, we consider the case that sample attrition exists and is monotone by
treatment status. Without loss of generality, we assume that assignment to treatment only
induces some individuals who otherwise would drop out of the sample to stay in the sample,
but not the opposite.
Assumption 1B: Monotonicity Assumption
Pr(a = 1, al = 0) = 0
Let Ok = Pr(a0 = 0, al = l = ) = Pr(a' = Olm = k), the proportion of program
participants with k erroneous matches in the outcome database who would drop out of the
sample irrespective of treatment status, and 'k = Pr(a0 = 0, al = 1 m = k), the proportion
of program participants with k erroneous matches in the outcome database who would be
induced to stay in the sample because of the treatment. The composition of qk, the proportion
of program participants with k matched records in the outcome database, can be written as
follows.
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T q = Pr(ni = k) = Pr(a l = , m = k - 1) + Pr(a = 0 , m = k)
= (1 - Ok-1)Pk-1 + OkPk, Vk> 1
Control group with k matches q = Pr(no = k) = Pr(ao = 1, m = k - 1)+ Pr(a 0=, m = k)
= (1 - Ok-1 - /k-1)Pk-1 + (Ok + bk)Pk, Vk> 1
The observed mean outcomes of the treatment and control groups with k+ 1 total matches
are, respectively,
E[y-,in = k + 1] = E[-ill(al = 1, m = k) or (a' = 0, m = k + 1)]
(1- Ok)Pk E[I a = 1, m = k] + Ok+1Pk+l E[k a' = 0, m =k + 1]k [ ja = ~ 0, , = k + 1]
qk+l Yk+1
(1 k - kPk)Pk E[-y lao = 1,m = k] + ' kPk E[ ao = O,a' =
S-k i 0 a
qk+l
Ok+1Pk+1E[yk+la i 
= 0, m = k + 1]
qk+1
( OPk (k .E[y'iaO = 1, nqk+1 k + I
V;kPk ( E [y ' ao = 0, al = 1, m =
qk+l k+1
k+Pk+1 E['k+ia i = 0, m = k + 1]
qk+1
qk+1
1, m = k] +
b = k] + E[Jkla = 1, m = k]) +
k+ 1 I
k] + k E[y la = O, a' = 1,m = k])+k + I
(3.11a)
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Treatment group with k matches
E[-yk+lln = k+ 1] = E[7yk+(ao = 1,m = k) or (ao = ,m = k+ 1)]
(1 - Ok - k)Pk E[ a = 1,= k] + + k+)Pk+l E[ ao = 0, m = k + 1]
qk+1 qk+1
(1 - k - Vk)Pk 1k(1 - Ok - k)Pk( E[y0 a0 = 1, m = k] + k E[ka = 1, m = k]) +qk+1 k + k + 1
Ok+lPk+1 E[ k+±la 1 = 0, m = k + 1] + Vk+lPk+1 E[Vk+l~aO = 0, a' = 0, m = k + 1]
qk+1 qk+l
(3.12a)
Define an intermediate parameter of interest, E[yd 0 (ao = 1, m = k) or (a1 = 0, m =
k + 1)], the common components between (11a) and (11b). Note that bkPk can be identified
from the observed data as the difference in the proportion of participants with k matches or
fewer between the non-treated and treated groups:
kkPk = Pr(a= 0, a l = 1,m= k)
Pr(no < k) - Pr(nl < k) = Q _- Q1 (3.13)
Therefore, the upper (or lower) bound of E [7- 1 (ao = 1, m = k) or (al = 0, m = k + 1)1
can be estimated by excluding the bottom (or top) VkPk percentile of the outcomes of the
treatment group with k + 1 matches as follows:
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-1
k1+1
Q11k+I
1
1 4kPk
1
k+1
Analogously, the upper (or lower) bound of E[V0 I(ao = 1,
can be estimated by excluding the bottom (or top) Vk+1Pk+l
the control group with k + 1 matches as follows:
QO
k+1
m = k) or (a' = 0, m = k+1)]
percentile of the outcomes of
1 - F 1Of(y)dy
1- k+lPk+l -1 k+lPk+1
1 F- (1- k+lPk+l
1 Jk+lPk+ k+
q1- -Gk+1
Denote as Ak: the difference in the intermediate parameters between the treatment and
control groups
Ak = E[y+iI (ao = 1, m = k) or (a1 = 0, m = k + 1)] -
E[ +I(ao = 1, m = k) or (a1 = 0, m = k + 1)]
(1 - Ok -k)k 1 E[y 1 - yo0 a0 = 1, m = k]
(1 - Ok - Qk)Pk + Ok+lPk+ k + 1
Therefore, the particular parameter of interest - the average treatment effect for a subpop-
ulation whose outcomes are always observed together with k erroneous matches, irrespective
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I yk+l f (y ) d y
k+1
F-1 (1- O)
-oo
k+1l
_0 -Yk+f(y)dY
of their treatment assignment status, can be identified as:
E[y - yolao = 1, m = k] = (1 - Ok - k)Pk + 0 k+lPk+l (k + 1)Ak
(1 - ok- Vk)Pk
S k+1 k+- + k (k + 1)Ak (3.14)
(1- - Ok k)Pk
where Qk = -,o qd. Note that Cqk+ 1 Ql+, Q0, and k + 1 are all observable in the data. Ak
is bounded by - , - . The denominator can be written as:
(1 - -Ok k)Pk = Mk - QO
Analogously with the discussion in Section 3.4.1, when prior knowledge or a consistent
estimator of the bound of Mk - [Mk, Mk] - is available, (1 -Ok - /k)Pk can be bounded
by Mk - Q , Mk - Q]. Therefore, E[y1 - yo (a = 1, m = k)] is bounded by the following
formula:
1 0 1 O 1 ± 1 -----
(, _ + ) ) ik+l l k+ l k+l k+I k+l k+l k+ k+1
k(qk+1+1++1) (k+11) [min },max{
Mk-Q Mk -Q Mk - Q Mk Qk }
(3.15)
The final parameter of interest, the difference in the mean potential outcomes for all
participants whose outcomes are always observed (possibly with imperfect matching), irre-
spective of their treatment status, can be written as:
1We take into account that - +or - k+ may be negative. Note that Mk - QO and
Mkc - Q must be positive.k k 'U~U V3L'C
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E[yl - yo=ao = 1]
0=Zo Pr(ao =, m = k)E[yl - yola = 1, m = k]
E Pr(ao = 1, m = k)
k=0
=O o((1 - Ok - Vk)Pk + Ok+lPk+l)(k + 1)Ak
O0
(1 - Ok - )k)Pk
I k=
0= Q - Qo1+o o l)(k + 1) Ak
=Oko(1 - Ok - Vk)Pk
(3.16)
Denoting the numerator of equation (3.15) as A and the denominator of equation (15)
as B.
oo00 __
A= ( Q k+l +1)(k+l)( 1  -k+) <
k=O
00oo
A < Z (q-o Q +1 oQ1)
k=O
(k+l)(Q 1 o - ) =
k+- k+1l
00oo
B= EMk
k=O
c00
E Mk
k=0Ok=O
00
k=O
00
E Mk
k=O
00
-
0QO=B
k=O
Then, the final parameter of interest E[yl - yolao = 1] is bounded by
[min{A/B, A/B}, max{A/B, A/B}]
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3.5 Summary
In this chapter, we show that average treatment effects in general cannot be identified or
even bounded mathematically when sample attrition and imperfect matching both exist.
However, if prior knowledge or a consistent estimator of the mismatching probability is
available and the treatment status only affects sample selection in "one direction," we can
construct bounds for average treatment effect for a specific subpopulation whose outcomes
would be observed irrespective of treatment assignment status. The bounds can be very tight
when the sample attrition rate is small and the probability of mismatches declines rapidly
with the number of mismatches.
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